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The Shape of Things

THIS IS A STORY STRAIGHT OUT OF BRAZIL'S recent pro-democratic somersault, when elections were announced and the tight Vargas press censorship was suddenly lifted. It seems that after General Eduardo Gómez visited the Minister of War to announce his intention to run for the presidency, certain Brazilian generals who had been most intimately associated with the dictatorship decided that the rules of military strategy demanded a change of front. General Goes Monteiro, chief of the General Staff and Vargas's right arm in the 1937 coup, was the first to embrace democracy. He sent a statement to the newspapers urging a return to normal constitutional government and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia. The Office of Censorship, part of the Department of Propaganda, immediately banned publication of the statement. Furious, Monteiro went to the Minister of War. It was the second time within forty-eight hours that the Minister had received a protesting general: first, the known anti-fascist Gómez; then the known fascist Monteiro. Wanting to avoid trouble, the Minister authorized the publication of the statement. News of the incident spread swiftly through the offices of the press. The liberal editors decided to be bold. One of them, just to explore the ground, prepared a strong anti-Vargas editorial and sent it to press without submitting it to censorship. The editors waited for their paper to be closed down. Nothing happened. So an inquiring reporter went to the Office of Censorship to see what was going on. He found the chief of the office in a rage. The Minister of War had gone over his head in the Monteiro case, and he no longer gave a hang what the press did. Twenty-four hours later, ignoring the censorship, the entire pro-Allied and anti-Vargas press launched a campaign for the candidacy of Eduardo Gómez for the presidency of Brazil. Freedom of the press was a fact. Vargas evidently thought it best to accept the fact and put his signature to a solemn decree lifting the censorship.

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WE ARE GLAD THAT MR. MORGENTHAU IN HIS statement to the House Banking and Currency Committee on the Bretton Woods legislation emphasized the point that "our country has as much to gain, perhaps more, than any other" from the enactment of the monetary agreements. Propagandists inspired either by malice or ignorance, or both, have spread the idea that the proposals now before Congress are designed to subsidize foreign countries at our expense and were sold to our dull-witted Treasury officials by the machiavellian Lord Keynes. Actually, there is more truth in the charge of the British opposition to Bretton Woods

that the scheme has been custom-built to American requirements and gives insufficient consideration to the problem of the debtor countries. Again, there is a notion that if Bretton Woods is dropped we shall return to pre-1914, or at least pre-1929, conditions in the foreign exchanges. Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, pointed out to the Banking and Currency Committee that the real alternative is the chaos that prevailed in the thirties. In the absence of a fund providing a cushion for currencies under pressure, many nations, he said, would be compelled to resort to "all the tricks" of economic warfare—multiple currencies, barter, dumping, quotas, exchange controls. As a creditor country, the United States would not find it easy to retaliate with the same weapons. With a large favorable trade balance we are not in a good position to use clearing arrangements, which would necessitate either reducing exports or increasing imports. Nor can we easily resort to currency depreciation: as the world is really on the "dollar standard" other countries would revise their exchange rates automatically. And, unless we cut loose from the gold standard altogether, we would have to raise our price for gold, encouraging mines the world over to increase production and pour the stuff in on us. Even bankers should know by now that it's not edible.

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WE ARE NOT IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE American Bankers Association has made provision for currency stabilization in its proposals for amending the Bretton Woods plan. While anxious to drop the International Monetary Fund the bankers have indorsed the International Bank and suggested a change in its articles so that it can make loans for stabilization purposes. We can understand the attraction of this scheme for the big financial interests. The International Bank is to operate mainly by guaranteeing loans made by private capital. A billion-dollar loan to Britain, guaranteed by an international institution, would be a very nice piece of business for Wall Street. The only difficulty is that Britain is determined not to borrow one dollar, let alone a billion, for stabilization. It takes the view that it is already sufficiently burdened by foreign debts and it is unwilling to increase the load except for projects which will earn the foreign exchange necessary to meet loan charges. Other countries with "soft" currencies are almost certain to follow the British lead. So the bankers' road to currency stabilization promises to prove a blind alley.

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THE ENTRY OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS INTO Mandalay is the climax of one of the most brilliant campaigns in the war. For more than a year Chinese, American, Indian, and British forces have been pushing forward in a coordinated effort, in the face of seemingly insuperable natural obstacles, to clear the Japanese out of North Burma and the greater part of Central Burma. Although the campaign has received comparatively little newspaper space in this country, it has probably accounted for about as many Japanese as Admiral Nimitz's drive against the Pacific islands. And its full fruits are yet to be realized. A few days before Indian troops pushed into Mandalay a strong British armored and motorized column cut through the jungle to capture

Meiktila and Thazi, thus cutting off a Japanese withdrawal into South Burma. Meanwhile the Chinese had pushed forward in the north to capture Lashio, former terminus of the Burma Road. The 50,000 Japanese in the Mandalay area were left the precarious prospect of withdrawing along mountain trails into Thailand, but as the Allies have complete mastery of the air not many of them are likely to escape. The success of the Burma campaign is important primarily because it raises the possibility of opening more direct supply lines into China. But it also represents a significant political setback for the Japanese, since it was in Burma that the Japanese originally enjoyed some success in obtaining active support from the native population. This support appears to have evaporated completely after three years' experience with co-prosperity.

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THERE'S A FINE OLD COLONIAL CUSTOM THAT the English have carried down through the centuries of stamping as "British" anything unclaimed by anybody else. It is undoubtedly meant as a compliment. Unfortunately, Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, and South Africans—the ingrates—frequently fail to see it that way. Take this war. The combined war effort of the Commonwealth nations has been magnificent. But dispatches from fronts on which Commonwealth formations are engaged usually short-cut specific designation by reporting simply on "British" operations. Recently, much to British chagrin, the shoe was on the other foot. It so happened that at certain stages in the tough fighting at the northern extreme of the western front, a good proportion of the combat troops in the Canadian First Army under command of the Canadian General Crerar were from the United Kingdom. A question had to be raised in the House: "What, what, British serving in the Canadian army without proper recognition?" The official Canadian explanation of the outrage struck us as both dignified and sensible. It read: "Modern armies are not static in position. Divisions or other formations from other armies may be engaged with the Canadian army for varying periods, and similarly Canadian formations may in turn engage in operations under other than Canadian command. This is in keeping with the flexibility of modern warfare, which demands mobility of troops over wide areas. It must be remembered that the First Canadian Corps and other Canadian troops form a major part of the British Eighth Army in Italy." The statement might also have recalled that fully one-third of all air crew personnel under the British air command is Canadian, either in the squadrons of the R. C. A. F. or in the R. A. F. itself. From what we know of Canadians, they have no objection to serving alongside British forces or even having British forces serve under their command. Perhaps the issue will have to be settled once and for all by granting Britain dominion status!

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IN APPOINTING FRED M. VINSON AS FEDERAL Loan Administrator, William H. Davis as Director of Economic Stabilization, and George W. Taylor as chairman of the War Labor Board, President Roosevelt has done a good deal to improve his economic high command. All three

men made enviable records in their previous positions. Judge Vinson has shown himself to be a man of courage and integrity, qualities which he will need in resisting the pressures of big business in his new post. His great popularity with Congress should prove an invaluable asset in the legislative storms that are bound to arise over the interpretation of post-war lending policy. Mr. Davis takes over as economic stabilizer at a particularly difficult period. Organized labor is intensifying its campaign against the Little Steel formula. The recent bull market in Wall Street reflects the opinion of financial circles that a mild inflation is already under way and a more drastic rise in prices cannot be long delayed. Mr. Davis's appointment and that of Mr. Taylor, who succeeds him as head of the War Labor Board, indicate that the Administration will continue to hew to the stabilization line. But it is probable that Davis will be somewhat more liberal than Vinson in authorizing "fringe" wage adjustments—most of which are non-inflationary in the sense that they do not justify an increase in the level of retail prices. The three appointments should go a long way toward assuring Congress, and the public, that economic affairs will be effectively handled during the crucial reconversion period.

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THE O'MAHONEY-KILGORE MAN-POWER BILL passed by the Senate was a far cry from the national-service act requested by the President at the urgent bidding of army and navy officials. And as it has little in common with the May-Bailey bill for "limited national service" passed by the House, it is difficult to foresee what sort of compromise measure is likely to be worked out by a House-Senate conference committee. The recent Allied triumphs on the eastern and western fronts, foreshadowing an early end to the European phase of the war, have undoubtedly dampened the enthusiasm of Congress for any kind of man-power bill. Few Congressmen appear to take seriously the Administration's argument that the need for man-power controls will be greatest after VE-Day, when it will be necessary to prevent employers and employees from carrying out their own private "reconversion" plans without regard for the requirements of the Japanese war. While the hour for a drastic national-service bill appears to have passed, it is to be hoped that the House-Senate conference will not let their differences over fundamental policy prevent the adoption of any measure at all. With all its faults, the O'Mahoney-Kilgore bill would serve a useful purpose in preventing labor hoarding and in giving teeth to the directives of the War Manpower Commission. There is much to be said for letting the WMC run the show, but it must have adequate power to carry out its program.

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IF THERE IS ANYTHING LESS ADMIRABLE THAN censorship, it is underhanded censorship like that indulged in by Paul Moss, who used his power over theater licenses in New York City to close down "Trio" because he disapproved of its theme—or was egged on by professional disapprovers of the sort of exposed by Wolcott Gibbs in the current *New Yorker*. Mayor LaGuardia, after having defended Moss with extremely illogical arguments, has now agreed to support legislation which would make it impossible

for license commissioners to set up as commissioners of morals. This sensible ending doesn't help the producer of "Trio," of course. He is suing the Commissioner for \$1,000,000. We hope he wins. We are in favor of any action that would set Moss back.

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WE'VE BEEN READING THE PAPERS AGAIN. Mexico's delegates in Chapultepec have introduced a charter for women of the Americas. "Women," says the preamble, "as individuals of the collectivity, are vital elements of life: first, as coproductive agents and, second, as the generic essence which is the building of human material from which new continents are made." . . . William C. Morland, Idaho Republican, took to the woods in 1932 because Hoover was defeated by Roosevelt. He stayed there until a week or so ago, when he was tracked down and arrested for pilfering supplies from ranger stations. He didn't know that Roosevelt was still President, and he hadn't heard that there was a war on. But then we didn't have any idea that we had been out of the woods for thirteen years. . . . "I have decided," Hitler is reported to have said, "to leave only ruins, rats, and epidemics to the Bolsheviks, Jews, and plutocrats." Obviously it should read:

Epidemics, ruins, and rats

To Bolsheviks, Jews, and plutocrats.

. . . A correspondent of the *Herald Tribune* has recalled what she describes as the "significant words" of the late Calvin Coolidge, uttered in an address February 23, 1926, in which he said: "Envy, malice, uncharitableness, class jealousies, race prejudices, and international enmities are not realities. They do not abide. They are only the fictions of unenlightened comprehension."

Italian Mystery Thriller

WHEN Mario Roatta walked out of the Virgilio Army Hospital in Rome he wrote the first chapter in a mystery thriller that is still unfinished. Nobody knows what the ending will be or exactly who the villain is; too many necessary clues are still hidden behind the blackout curtains of the Allied military censorship. Still, the facts already in hand are worth examining. They are suggestive if not conclusive.

Roatta is supposed to have been ill as the result of an automobile injury. (Was he really ill?) This was the reason given for his detention in the army hospital instead of in prison. Press reports stated that his wife had called on him about nine o'clock on the evening of his escape—long after visiting hours. (Why was she allowed to come at that time?) Then, it seems, "the lights went out for an hour." (Why?) At the end of an hour the lights came on, and, presto, the injured prisoner had disappeared through guards, locked gates, and over the high prison wall. (How?) He is still at large; the police are looking for him "with the help of the Allied authorities." (Where is Roatta hiding? Who is protecting him?)

Now let's go back a little. In any crime story the first things to do are to look for a motive and then figure out who had the best opportunity to do the deed.

Roatta was a wholesale murderer and terrorist and Marshal Badoglio's long-time chief of staff. He was on trial not only for his official conduct during the glorious days of the Ethiopian campaign and later in Spain and later still in Greece and Yugoslavia. He was on trial also for treasonable acts committed at the head of the S.I.M., the Fascist military intelligence service. After the 1943 armistice Badoglio had kept Roatta in this post with the full knowledge and approval of the British and American authorities. He was dropped only when both Yugoslavia and Greece, in the late autumn of 1943, demanded the right to try Roatta as a war criminal; he was charged among other things with the mass murder of hostages, including women and children.

Throughout the Fascist era in Italy Roatta was a favorite of the leading industrialists who maintained Mussolini in power and of the Black Shirt élite. They valued him because he knew leftist and liberal Italy and had no scruples about crushing opposition by blackmail, murder, and bribery.

When Badoglio came to power Roatta was obviously the man to handle the delicate job of shifting Italy from the losing to the winning side in the war without dislocating the social, financial, and industrial order established by fascism. This was what the British Tories wanted, too. But Count Sforza, as head of the purge commission, apparently took seriously the armistice provision that Italy be purged of Fascists. At any rate, he had Roatta arrested along with an underling, Colonel Santo Emanuele, and a number of lesser officers of the S.I.M.

These men quite naturally felt themselves betrayed. Had they not been faithful servants of the monarchy and the Marshal? Under examination they "squealed," and the evidence they gave, it is reliably reported, would, if made public, force a general purge of the whole Badoglio crew, the rich Fascist angels of banking and industry, including many men now working hand in glove with the new occupying authorities. It would have been a sharp defeat for Churchill and his policy in Italy and for the Allied military and political regime, a victory for the forces of the democratic left in Italy. The word went out that Roatta must not come to trial. Americans recently back from Italy have reported this without qualification. They do not know—or at least they have not told—who gave the order. But Roatta's escape saved both Fascist hold-overs and Allied officials from acute political embarrassment. The motive is there, not to be questioned; but many men share it.

As for the opportunity: The prisons under fascism were in the hands of Roatta's S.I.M. The Allied Commission had ordered the retention of a large proportion of the old guards and administrators on the ground that they were "experienced." Colonel Agrifoglio, who succeeded Roatta as chief of the S.I.M., was one of the S.I.M. gang from fascist days. Under such circumstances the necessary complicity of the authorities must have been easy to arrange.

Nor is this the first time a strategic disappearance has been arranged. Luigi Federzoni, ex-president of the Fascist Senate, skipped to Vatican City just before his purge trial was to begin. He is now in Portugal, and the report from Lisbon is that he arrived on an American plane. General Carboni, another S.I.M. chief who threatened to spill inconvenient facts, also disappeared; he has been variously re-

ported in the United States, in England, and in the Portuguese embassy at Rome. It is even rumored that Badoglio himself spent some weeks in the British embassy—weeks that coincided with Count Sforza's last few weeks as head of the purge commission.

Meanwhile the Cabinet crisis that followed Roatta's escape and the riotous demonstration last week has ended for the moment with a decision that these events do not warrant the Cabinet's resignation. Instead it has decided upon "fundamental" reforms. The purge commission, diluted after the retirement of Sforza, has been reorganized and strengthened. And General Taddeo Orlando, another Roatta man, has been dismissed from his job as head of the Carabinieri.

This is the way things stand as we go to press: the mystery still unsolved; the Italian government shaken but holding on. One thing we are sure of is that things won't stand still for long. For the Italian people have shown that they will not forever stand being kicked around and sold out. They are sick of being ruled by left-over Fascists held in office by Allied officials; sick of seeing Fascist criminals protected by their fellows in office or by Allied intervention. The Roatta story isn't over—but enough has happened to show how the Italians feel about their present bosses.

Senatorial Trouble-Maker

SENATOR VANDENBERG'S latest speech indicated that he is almost certain to play a disruptive role at the San Francisco conference. He took as his starting-point in the Senate a statement on Poland made by Foreign Secretary Eden in the Commons, but the Senator from Michigan characteristically stressed only one side of that Eden "warning." "It is imperative," the British Foreign Secretary has declared, "both that the Lublin administration should take no measures against Poles merely because they do not recognize the authority and that such Poles should cease active resistance to local authorities which endangers the line of communications of the advancing Russian armies." Though Senator Vandenberg began by saying "both these warnings are imperative," he made no further reference to the second. Yet judging from the anti-Soviet propaganda and activities of Polish émigrés in London and Polish-American groups in this country, it is not difficult to imagine that the Lublin regime must be confronted by similar activities at home. Abroad the Poles have become the principal instrument on which rest German hopes for splitting the United Nations. The Copperhead press, which slyly apologized for Nazi aggression, is now weeping crocodile tears over "poor Poland," and under cover of his new "conversion" to international cooperation Vandenberg is encouraging Polish intransigence.

To suggest, as Vandenberg did, that the Yalta settlement on Poland "shall pass in full review at the final peace table," is to strike at the very basis of Allied unity. The support given by Kerensky and other anti-Soviet Russian sources abroad to Moscow's insistence on the Curzon line indicates how deeply Russians, irrespective of politics, feel about this issue. In their eyes the land east of the Curzon line was wrongfully taken from Russia at a time when it had been weakened by war and revolution, and taken from it in defi-

ance of a ruling made by a British diplomat who was certainly no sympathizer with Bolshevism. Polish treatment of the Ukrainian people in that territory, once the subject of a sensational exposé by the Manchester *Guardian*, did not help to reconcile them to Polish overlordship. It may be added that the White Russians and the Jews often suffered the same kind of treatment. If Senator Vandenberg is concerned with "basic justice," as he says he is, he might well consider how much "basic justice" there would have been in a decision which returned to Poland this territory in which the Poles are and were a minority. It would have pleased the Poles, but would it have been just to the White Russians and the Ukrainians? In pursuit of that same "basic justice," Senator Vandenberg might also ask why the Polish government in exile never offered to return the Teschen area, which was Poland's share of the loot in the Nazi dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

Anyone who tries to disentangle the historical rights and wrongs, the mingled ethnic populations, the equities of territorial allocation in Eastern Europe will soon see the impossibility of any solution that will seem fair and just to every group involved. In our own opinion the majority of the people east of the Curzon line will be better off in the Soviet Union than they were in Poland. The non-Polish peoples will not suffer racial discrimination—and neither for that matter will the Poles—and the peasants will certainly have greater opportunity than they had in the backward and landlord-ridden Polish state.

These considerations aside, the fact is that the Russians feel that this territory is justly theirs and necessary to their security. They will not give it up, and they would fight to retain it. This is a fact we must recognize. We must either accept it as the *sine qua non* of Allied unity or drift into a state of hostility toward an ally over lands the Poles themselves seized by force after the last war. The choice between those two courses was made long ago by the responsible leaders of the British and American peoples. The Poles would be well advised to accept it as a fact and to reconstruct their national life on that basis. No change can be made in those arrangements without a third world war. Therefore, those who suggest, as Vandenberg does, that the Polish settlement be revised are heading us away from world peace and toward a new catastrophe. Is this to be Vandenberg's line at San Francisco?

COMING IN *The NATION*

LIN YUTANG: *Reply to Edgar Snow*

JACQUES MARITAIN: *The Faith Behind Democracy*

CHARLES G. BOLTE: *A Veteran Looks at
Peace-Time Conscription*

CHARLES ABRAMS: *The Walls of Stuyvesant Town*

Fair Employment in Massachusetts?

BY J. MITCHELL MORSE

Boston, March 7

THE Massachusetts Legislature's Committee on State Administration held a hearing today on legislation to outlaw racial and religious discrimination in employment. By an unaccountable lack of coordination the liberal groups backing such legislation had allowed seven bills to be presented instead of one, and at 10:30 this morning, when the hearing was scheduled to begin, they had not yet agreed on a united attack.

Fortunately, the committee was tied up elsewhere until noon. The eight hundred spectators were restless, but the witnesses for the C.I.O., the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and other interested groups improved the time by getting together on a program. When the hearing finally got under way witness after witness announced that his organization would support any one of the seven bills or any new synthesis that might be worked out. The legislators who came in to record themselves for the legislation followed suit. The committee will most probably have to write a new bill, and in the process differences can be ironed out.

The seven bills differ only on matters of administrative detail; the one serious point of disagreement was eliminated before the hearing started. The Massachusetts C.I.O. and the New England division of the American Jewish Congress, sponsoring identical bills, had made a deal for the support of the American Federation of Labor by exempting trade unions from the provisions of their bills. This would have allowed the A.F. of L. to continue its discrimination against Negroes. But the A. F. of L. didn't deliver, and its lack of support will probably turn out to be a good thing after all; for this morning the bills were amended to include unions.

The most sensational development of the day was a strong statement by Richard J. Cushing, Catholic Archbishop of Massachusetts, to the effect that he favored any bill that would outlaw the anti-Christian practice of discrimination. Similar statements were made by Henry K. Sherrill and Lewis O. Hartman, respectively the Episcopalian and Methodist Bishops of Massachusetts; Frank Jennings, executive secretary of the Massachusetts Council of Churches; the Rev. Kenneth Hughes, a leading Negro minister of Cambridge; Father John S. Sexton, editor of the *Pilot*, the official Catholic archdiocesan weekly; Emory Stevens Bucke, editor of *Zion's Herald*, an independent Methodist weekly, and Rabbi Joshua Liebman, of Temple Israel, Boston. Oddly enough, the Rabbinical Council was unable to agree on an official statement; Rabbi Liebman spoke only for himself.

No organized opposition is yet apparent. A few seedy-looking Christian Fronters circulated petitions outside the statehouse, but if it occurred to any of them to attend the hearing they held their peace. Backers of the legislation think the really effective opposition will take the form of private

pressure on individual legislators by organizations which legislators are accustomed to regard with respect, if not with awe.

The committee itself was neither too friendly nor too bright. In questioning the labor witnesses several members made objections that drew shouts of laughter from the audience, and the chairman warned against "spontaneous outbursts." One said he didn't think questions as to race and religion on employment application blanks were intended for purposes of discrimination; another asked, "If an employer doesn't know his employees' religion, and one of them gets a heart attack, how will he know whether to call a rabbi or a priest?" The more astute objectors asked if it wouldn't be better to wait one or two years and see how the New York law works out, or to submit the Massachusetts bill to a referendum. I was reminded of Browning's Count Guido Franceschini:

—How, ready enough to rise at the right time,
I still could recognize no time mature.

But the committeemen's state of mind is simpler than that. From the hostile and badgering manner in which they put their questions it is obvious that they just don't want to outlaw discrimination, now or ever. Fortunately, they are on the defensive. The hearing will be resumed Tuesday, March 13.

Over the Rivers

BY CHARLES G. BOLTE

THE squeeze is now put on Germany hard, with the establishment of Allied bridgeheads on the Berlin side of both the Oder and the Rhine. The two great barriers of east and west have been breached; the Allied generals have a firm hold on the initiative; and the German high command has lost in a single week its two remaining chances of winning major delays in which it might have improvised some desperate measures of defense.

Withal, the only thing to be said about when the war will end in Europe is just what could have been said at any time in the last six months: it may be tomorrow and it may not be for weeks. After the way the Rhine was crossed, it is pretty clear that anything can happen in these closing phases of the war against Germany. And after the way the Germans rallied to make counter-attacks upon the bridgehead, it is also pretty clear that "anything" will not be enough to finish the Wehrmacht: *everything* will have to happen to it. Therefore the chances are that these crossings of the Rhine and the Oder, important though they are in saving lives and time and in embarrassing the German high command, have only brought us appreciably closer to victory; they have not established victory as an event of the next moment.

When this is said, one must admit that one would not like to be in the shoes of the German commander on either the eastern or the western front. Each heads a sadly battered force, patched together out of odd lots of troops, scrambled divisional elements, and ill-trained over-age *Volksstürmers* of dubious quality. They are short of armor and growing progressively shorter of gasoline, what with the repeated air attacks on refineries; yet they must keep their striking forces mobile so as to meet new threats in unexpected

quarters—as when the Americans showed up on the wrong side of the Rhine fifty miles south of where they were expected. They almost entirely lack air support, not only for cover and counter-attack but for vital reconnaissance; so that they are, as it were, half-blind. And they face troops numerically far superior, backed by fresh reinforcements, enjoying plenty of armor and superlative air support, led by commanders who can dictate the time and place of every battle on terms most advantageous to themselves, and with their morale boosted sky high by the apparent closeness of victory.

The manner of the Rhine crossing must have been an added fillip to morale on both sides of the Reich, although hardly so within it. It is a scenario fit only for a Grade B movie: the rapid advance of the armored patrol through the quiet Rhine country above Remagen, the sighting of the great railroad bridge still standing, the hasty request for permission to cross passing up through channels, the lone and small explosion as the patrol went across, the pulling of the detonators, the fanning out on the other side against meager opposition, the patrol leader's happy bride saying in New York that she was surprised her lieutenant could even find the Rhine because "he never could find anything at home."

These things are ordered better in Hollywood Grade A pictures: there the bridge would have been at Cologne or Düsseldorf. It is of incomparable advantage to have the bridge, and the fact that it was unblown and nearly unguarded is deeply significant of breakdown in the efficiency of the Wehrmacht; nevertheless, this is not the best place to cross the Rhine. Eisenhower's main strength is concentrated to the north, opposite the Ruhr, where lie industrial targets of great strategic value, as well as the beginnings of the wide, flat North German plain stretching toward Berlin. In the north is tank country, ideal for encirclement and pursuit; behind the Remagen bridgehead lie hills, woods, and no targets of great importance. On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that the seizing of the bridge saved a division in Allied casualties; and if the Allies win the race to pile up troops and guns inside the bridgehead for a breakout before the Germans move down troops and guns to smash it in, the fruits of a flanking sweep down the Rhine's east bank through Siegburg toward the Ruhr, or even farther east toward Kassel, are potentially great.

In any case, the forced transference of troops from the Düsseldorf-Wesel sector to contain the bridgehead will make a crossing in the north far less costly, and such a crossing—or crossings—with the British Second Army and the First Airborne Army not yet committed, is distinctly probable.

Meanwhile, the big Russian drive for Berlin seems to have got under way, after a month in which the flanks of Zhukov's dangerous salient were rolled out. With the enemy's Baltic front virtually eliminated and Danzig and Stettin invested, the Red Army points toward Berlin from a nearly straight line on the Oder-Neisse. From this firm base one of the last great battles of the European war will be fought; and its inevitable outcome will spell at least the beginning of the end of organized German resistance, for without Berlin the already shaky internal administration of the Reich will collapse.

It's Not the Clockwork

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, March 8

IN FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN'S apocalyptic "Europe on the Eve," there is a quotation from Arnold J. Toynbee that comes to mind in considering the voting arrangements agreed upon for the new international security organization. "The British electorate of this generation," Toynbee wrote in 1935, "were the children of an age in which a ci-devant Christian society had come to believe that its talent for clockwork—institutional as well as metallic—could dispense it from the need of holding convictions and of summoning up the courage to act upon them when the consequences of such action were likely to be unpleasant." Despite the wise and thoughtful position taken by such great organs of conservative opinion as the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune*, discussion of the new security organization is likely to focus on the voting arrangements, on the "clockwork," in a kind of naive and indolent reliance on the magic of formula. Preliminary rumblings from the Senate, as in the extraordinarily woozy speech made by Bushfield of South Dakota Tuesday, indicate that the obstructionist and the perfectionist will find this their happiest hunting ground.

It may serve to clear the air of pending obfuscation if certain facts are made clear at the outset. The first is that the original proposals for Dumbarton Oaks, as put forward privately by President Roosevelt to the British and Russians last June, called for unanimity by the great powers whenever sanctions were to be applied against aggression. This veto against the use of force to be enjoyed by any one of the great powers flows in the sphere of theory from the concept of sovereignty; a sovereign power cannot be forced into war without its consent. More practically, in the sphere of politics, this veto reflected past experience with the Senate in the League and World Court fights. No proposal which would commit this country to military action without its consent stands a ghost of a chance in the Senate. Even before the meetings at Dumbarton Oaks, this principle of unanimity was accepted by the British, the Russians, and the Chinese.

So far as the great powers are concerned, the new voting arrangements are those of an association of sovereign nations, in the full sense of that term so sacred to the Senate, and not of a super-state. So far as the smaller powers are concerned, Dumbarton Oaks marks a first, though still vague and tentative, step toward a world order. The League of Nations operated, like the old Polish Diet, on the principle of unanimity; any power, however small, could block action by it. The new setup, still far from satisfactory, requires unanimous action by the five major powers which will occupy permanent seats on the proposed eleven-man Security Council and two of the six lesser powers to be elected to the Council by the Assembly of all the United Nations. Here it seems that the Russians, fearful of delays, were for action on the unanimous vote of the Big Five and that Mr. Roosevelt prevailed upon

them to agree to add two votes by smaller powers. This may some day prove an additional clog on action, but it is certainly better than the voting arrangements of the League.

At Dumbarton Oaks the question arose as to what would happen if one of the great powers were itself accused of aggression. Would it have the right to veto action against itself? In the League an accused member was not allowed to vote on its own case. The Chinese seem to have been strongly opposed to giving an accused great power the right to veto action against itself. This was also the American position. The British position was not made public. The White Paper on Dumbarton Oaks does not even mention the problem. The one correspondent who was able to get real news out of Dumbarton Oaks, James B. Reston of the *New York Times*, reported on September 8 that the British "make clear that the whole success of the League will depend on the 'trust and confidence and sincerity of purpose of the four great powers' [this was before the decision to admit France as a fifth], and they seem to indicate that in dealing with the problem of aggression by one of the permanent members, there is a limit beyond which the machinery of the proposed league cannot go." The Russians were insistent on retaining their right to veto action against themselves, and the best information I can obtain is that they were adamant at Yalta on two points—(1) retaining the veto and (2) barring any further expansion of the membership of the Security Council, which they fear may become a debating society if it grows too large.

The reasons for the Soviet position were reflected in another Reston dispatch of September 29, which bore the earmarks of an "off-the-record" talk with some Soviet official. "Soviet Russia," Reston reported, "is eager to cooperate with the United Nations in a system of collective security, but she has not yet got over her fear that the other great powers may try to turn a proposed league of nations into a sort of capitalist alliance against her. . . . Soviet Russia still remembers that . . . while the League never seemed to be able to get the necessary 'unanimity' to take action against Germany or Japan, it was able to get the necessary support to ease Soviet Russia out of the League at the time of the first Finnish war. Furthermore, the Soviet officials cannot forget that, even as recently as late 1939 and early 1940, the British and French had prepared an expeditionary force to send to the aid of Finland against her . . . 'the capitalist bogey' in Russia is still as strong as 'the Communist bogey' in the West."

The few smaller powers which had already expressed an opinion on Dumbarton Oaks before these voting arrangements were made public all opposed the grant of veto powers to one of the Big Five in a case where it was itself accused. A possible compromise was foreshadowed by L. B. Pearson, the Canadian ambassador to the United States, in a speech at Winnipeg last December 27. "In any circumstances," Pear-


son said, "everything depends on the close and friendly co-operation of the great powers. The right of veto, in itself, is of no great importance. If it doesn't exist, and action is taken by a majority against a great power, then the organization may go down before the threat of another world war. If it is granted, *without limitation, and is used by a great power to prevent the organization even considering a dispute to which that power is a party*, then the organization becomes almost a farce, and the non-veto powers would probably not consider it worth preserving" (my italics). The compromise achieved by the President at Yalta permits the Security Council to hear a case against a great power without its consent and to do what it can to bring about a peaceful settlement. But it permits any great power to veto sanctions or military action in a case in which it is itself accused.

This has already been used to impute sinister designs to the Soviet Union and has furnished ammunition to the Soviet-baiters in Congress and out. It may be useful to recall that the compromise accepted by the Soviet Union goes considerably beyond what the Senate of the United States has been willing to accept in the past. One of the points which the Security Council can decide without the consent of the accused great power is "whether the legal aspect of the case should be referred to the court for advice." The court in question is the proposed new international court of justice

which is to be part of the new security organization. The terms of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement provide that the statute of this court shall either be the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the so-called World Court, or a new statute based on it. The Dumbarton Oaks agreement also provides that "all members of the organization shall *ipso facto* be parties to the statute of the international court of justice."

When the question of our adherence to the World Court was before the Senate in 1935, one of the fears was that the court might consider a case against the United States without our permission. This was reflected in the Vandenberg "reservation" put forward at that time. The late Senator Norris sought to make this reservation stronger. He insisted that as a condition of our adherence the World Court be forbidden to hear any case against the United States unless the Senate had first, by a two-thirds' vote, given its consent. This strict veto was demanded, not against sanctions, military or economic, but against the peaceful adjudication of an international dispute to which the United States was a party. The recollection of this may serve to make us a little less pharisaical about the Soviet position.

Had the Soviet Union not insisted on the retention of its veto against sanctions in complaints against itself, the Senate might very well have done so. It is not difficult to imagine Senatorial oratory on the threat of foreign armed interfer-



DISAPPROVING EYE

ence in the event of a complaint by a Latin American country against the United States. The universal tendency seems to be to deny a veto to others but reserve one to oneself. Thus while the Dutch in their own official "Suggestions" on Dumbarton Oaks oppose the idea of allowing a great power to veto military action against itself, they want to retain the right to decide whether to join or not to join in sanctions in any dispute of this kind. This, to quote a famous comic-strip character who may be little known to our more erudite readers, is the "Let's you and him fight" attitude of Popeye's friend, the tireless moocher, Mr. Wimpy. Bushfield's is even

simpler, a monumental piece of national egotism. His position seems to be that other powers should be governed by majority rule—while we should retain a veto against action of any kind. The real answer, of course, is that without unity on the part of the great powers, the new organization and the world with it are doomed to a new world war anyway. It is on the growth of better mutual understanding, on the willingness of the peoples of the major powers to see each other's point of view and to make the necessary adjustments and compromises, that security depends. Not on clock-work.

What Happened in Mexico

BY ANITA BRENNER

Mexico City, March 8

AT THE closing sessions of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, the twenty nations which had sought a formula on Argentina discarded the "having wonderful time, wish you were here" message favored by many at the beginning for a longer statement. The Argentine flag had been included in the decorations because, said the gentleman in charge of protocol, "We feel Argentina will be here with us before this conference ends." But obviously he had not consulted Mr. Stettinius. Even delegates from countries close enough to Argentina to fear its armaments favored hands off and thought the Argentine people should be left to handle their militarists themselves.

The rub, or as Latin Americans put it, the "neuralgic point," was that two issues not directly connected with the war had got tangled up with the Argentine government's equivocal behavior in regard to the Nazis. The first was an issue that for many years has disturbed relations between the United States and Latin American countries—whether granting or withholding recognition should be used to exert pressure on de facto governments. The second threatens the peace of some of our closest collaborators in this hemisphere—what price democracy? In Latin America as in the United States most people seem to believe that a victory for the Allies will by itself bring a victory for democracy, and our own propaganda in this hemisphere has certainly underscored this idea. Embarrassingly for us, however, in many American countries belligerence in the war is tied up with the notion of fighting immediately against tyranny at home.

Under the nimble generalship of Padilla, Berle, Rockefeller, and Messersmith, all speaking Spanish, these two most delicate questions were disentangled from the point the United States wished to press—namely, that we are all in the anti-Axis fight and the Argentine boys are disturbing our security by trafficking with the enemy. Since no American government could balk openly at this, the wish was expressed—wrapped in flowers, condolences, and regrets—that the Argentine nation would put itself in a position to become one of the United Nations, and not just on paper, either.

Very likely this can happen even if the Perón crew man-

age to engineer the announced Argentinian elections in their favor. But even as an ally Argentina can continue trafficking with the enemy through its main conduit, the Franco government, as long as the United States and other American governments, each for its own reasons, maintain friendly diplomatic relations with the Spanish dictator. No doubt the solution to that problem will be found in some clever device for enlisting Franco's Spain also as one of the United Nations.

The pronouncement on Argentina came bang at the very end of two weeks of deliberation on other matters. Since it was debated by the Foreign Ministers behind closed doors I cannot report on which negotiator argued for what. However, there was no secrecy in the discussion of the 287 proposals, telescoped into 60, that went through the democratic conference mill, and all agreements reached through this process were evidently genuine. Moreover, since they are healthily out in the open, they are susceptible to further friendly work on them. This, more than any resounding document, is the real achievement of the conference, and it is a truly momentous one.

The fundamental difference between the United States and the Latin American position was that we think first of the war and view most matters from that angle, whereas Latin America thinks first of national security. In page after page of objections to Dumbarton Oaks and in other statements the Latin Americans demanded that the political and territorial integrity of every nation, however small, be guaranteed. This was assured, in substance, by the two principal documents of the conference, the Act of Chapultepec and the Declaration of Mexico. The United States delegation, and American opinion generally, take them to mean that at last Latin America fears us no more; Latin America sees in them a strong pledge from us against interference of any kind in its affairs. But at any rate they were signed in mutual happiness, though how effective Chapultepec will be in inter-American clashes remains to be settled, alas, by the wider decisions to be taken at San Francisco.

The divergent voices of the United States and Latin America on the war and peace reshaped many proposals, altering some to dismal before-and-after exhibits. Haiti, for instance,

proposed a strong-toothed agreement binding the Americas against racial or religious discrimination, on the ground that such discrimination and all propaganda for it are anti-scientific, anti-Christian, and fascist. As passed, the agreement merely remarks that racial and religious discrimination are indeed anti-scientific and un-Christian, and will every nation please do the best it can about them. A resolution binding the signatories to fight the activities of agents of totalitarian countries and their satellites was passed with "totalitarian" blue-penciled and "Axis" substituted, thus becoming a military measure rather than the broader and longer action against fascism that Latin American spokesmen wished to make it.

As between the American peoples, the only real difference of view that the conference brought into the limelight was a business argument. The delegates on the famous Economic Committee wrestled with the problem tenaciously, changing phrases as late as the night of the last day, but the basic difference remained: Mr. Clayton asked for every guaranty and protection for private enterprise, including lowered tariffs, while the Latin Americans upheld government participation in business, government price cushioning of products vital in each economy, and government development and protection of industry, including keeping tariffs up. It was all put into the Economic Charter, which, one delegate afterward drily remarked, is a "document for another world." There was strong unanimity on one point—that economic salvation lies in increased consumption, to be achieved by stepped-up production, lowered prices, and rising wages. Perhaps action based on this doctrine will bridge a good many of the conflicts at the inter-American economic conference scheduled for June. Some of the delegates muttered that what we were up to was imperialism and that Latin American economies would be sunk if they played the game our way. But one distinguished scholar said that, after all, at the end of the war the world will need to buy a lot of things, and that there might turn out to be no problem for his country if the Russians would learn to drink coffee. Banking, therefore, on a lot of buyers in Europe, Latin America is worrying over what the devastated lands are going to use for money.

The subcommittee that worked on economic problems from the angle of individual guaranties and benefits hardly locked horns at all. Its prettiest product is Miss Lenroot's "Declaration of Social Principles of America," founded on the idea "that man must be the center of interest and efforts of nations and governments." (America speaks here for physical protection in the form of public-health programs and industrial safety devices, for economic protection in the form of a real wage rising as the cost of living rises, plus freedom of organization and the right to strike, for social protection in the form of honestly adequate social-security programs, and for the implementing of these protections by private, governmental, and international action.)

Other proposals passed came out for increased participation of women in state and inter-state social-welfare activities, and for inter-American help to the homeless children of Europe. When this committee finished its work, its members spontaneously thanked Miss Lenroot for her brilliant leadership; one delegate, a doctor, burst out in a warm aside, "That woman is a jewel."

All these welfare recommendations can, of course, be dismissed as mere words, but they are not ambiguous words. They emphasize an important intangible that undeniably affected the whole tone and manner of the conference—the presence of what seemed to be an American spirit, a community of feeling on fundamental human questions. It is the real strength in the papers that were signed.

10 Years Ago in "The Nation"

ALMOST COINCIDENTALLY with the President's message to Congress asking that the National Recovery Administration be retained in substantially its present form for at least another year, Senator Wagner introduced his industrial-disputes bill, which he calls the National Labor Relations Act, and which calls for considerable modification of the labor provisions of the NIRA. Although Senator Wagner need not expect the support of either Mr. Roosevelt or Secretary Perkins—who prefers to keep industrial-disputes machinery under the aegis of the Department of Labor—his bill is in many respects admirably devised to eliminate the weaknesses of the present methods of dealing with labor troubles, and it deserves the support not only of the A. F. of L., which indeed it has, but of every employer who honestly wants to live on a democratic footing with his employees.—*March 6, 1935.*

A GREAT EDITOR and a still greater reformer and crusader was lost to journalism in the death of Fremont Older, editor of the *San Francisco Call-Bulletin*, on March 3. . . . It was he who came to the aid of Tom Mooney and ferreted out the truth about the case, for which achievement the rich and respectable of San Francisco were ready to tear him limb from limb.—*March 13, 1935.*

THE NEW OFFERING of the Group Theater is called "Awake and Sing" (Belasco Theater). The author is one Clifford Odets, who has long been a member of the Group's acting company, and the play reveals as interesting a new talent as I have seen in the theater for a long time.—JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH, *March 13, 1935.*

WITH THE DEATH of the second Oliver Wendell Holmes a generation practically disappears; in the handful of remaining survivors of the Civil War there is not one man of distinction. . . . All in all, if there was a man better entitled to be called the foremost American I cannot name him.—OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, *March 20, 1935.*

ADOLF HITLER has administered the coup de grâce to what remained of the authority of the Versailles treaty. By a dramatic act he has officially announced what everybody knew was under way—the complete rearmament of Germany—and has capped it by an impressive military parade down Unter den Linden.—*March 27, 1935.*

BOOKS OF THE MONTH: Ralph Bates, "Lean Men"; Harold J. Laski, "The State in Theory and Practice"; C. Day Lewis, "Collected Poems"; Vincent Sheean, "Personal History"; John Strachey, "The Nature of Capitalist Crisis"; Thomas Wolfe, "Of Time and the River"; Hans Zinsser, "Rats, Lice and History."

John Bull Looks for Customers

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

BRTAIN, scornfully dismissed by Napoleon as "a nation of shopkeepers," conducted its merchandising so successfully in the nineteenth century that it was able to build out of surplus earnings a large portfolio of investments. To a considerable degree it turned into a nation of *rentiers* and shoppers, buying far more on world markets than it sold and meeting the balance from its foreign interest and dividends. But in the course of two wars these investments have largely been liquidated, and now Britain must revert to the role of shopkeeper in order to maintain its position as an international shopper. The alternative—to reduce drastically its purchases from abroad—is, as I have explained in previous articles, no real alternative, for it would mean empty larders and factories idle for want of raw materials.

It is not surprising, therefore, that all official pronouncements on British post-war economic policy place particular emphasis on the revival of foreign trade. The very first paragraph of the White Paper on Employment Policy issued last June is devoted to the vital necessity not merely of maintaining the volume of pre-war exports but of expanding them greatly. Cabinet ministers, speaking on this subject, have frequently stated that a 50 per cent increase over the 1938 figure will be required. Good authorities consider this an underestimate, but even so it means a fivefold expansion over the 1943 level.

Although its spokesmen constantly stress the importance of exports, the British government has yet to make known any long-term plans to insure their growth. It talks in very general terms of cooperation with other nations for the removal of trade barriers and cites its signature of the Atlantic Charter and the Mutual Aid Agreement as "proof of its intentions." But it has not indicated what positive steps it is prepared to take toward fulfilling the obligations assumed in these agreements. Nor, indeed, has this country, and the truth is the British are waiting for America to make the first move. They are impressed by the blueprints for an expansion of world trade produced by the appropriate departments in Washington; but they know that these blueprints must remain worthless until stamped with Congressional approval, and they fear that economic thinking on Capitol Hill is still strongly tinged with nationalism. The Bretton Woods legislation is the first test; the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, which expires in June, will follow shortly. Favorable action might induce Whitehall to get off the fence where it perches uneasily while business men clamor for guidance on national policy so that they may draw up their own post-war programs.

However, if official plans are lacking, there is no shortage of unofficial ones. Business organizations, trade unions, political bodies, and various research groups are all busy setting forth their solutions of the export problem. While these naturally vary widely they nearly all have some features in common. For instance, they almost all reject orthodox *laissez*

faire principles; almost all accept the necessity of some degree of government intervention, guidance, or control. As the report of the International Trade Policy Committee of the Federation of British Industries (equivalent of the National Association of Manufacturers) puts it, "Market forces cannot be relied upon automatically to establish equilibrium in international trade. The choice is a return to the jungle law of unregulated competition or the adoption of conscious planning to raise world prosperity." As an instrument of such conscious planning the committee recommends the creation of an International Economic Council one of the functions of which would be to "guide international trade into channels where it would be most beneficial to both producer and consumer." The methods by which this objective would be achieved are not very well defined, but the committee approves of commodity marketing agreements and suggests investigation of the possibility of agreements of the same nature covering manufactured goods, to be negotiated by similar industries in different countries. This, of course, means cartels, or, as the British prefer to call them, "trade accords."

The fact is that British business men are terrified of American competition in export markets. "How will the United States use her surplus capacity after the war?" asked Sir George Schuster, M.P., in a speech last October to the American Chamber of Commerce in London. "Will she pour it out on the world . . . or will she concentrate on raising living standards at home and leave some leeway in the export trade for others? . . . We are frightened at what we read on your country's preparations for post-war industry and export."

A survey conducted last year by Harold Whitehead and Staff, Ltd., a London firm of industrial consultants, showed that 77 per cent of the business executives it polled anticipated post-war competition from American products in export markets. To a question whether they favored post-war arrangements with the United States regarding export spheres generally, 60 per cent gave an affirmative answer, while 59 per cent supported arrangements regarding sources of raw materials. Many letters received by the conductors of this survey stressed the strong desirability of close cooperation between both the British and American governments and British and American business. At the same time there was frank recognition of the immense difficulties involved resulting from differences in national outlook. One letter, for example, declared: "In Britain it is thought that wasteful competition can be curtailed with great advantage both to British industry and to American industry, and that in respect of many markets of the world it ought to be possible for arrangements to be made limiting particular lines of manufacture to one country or the other. But this would be completely unacceptable, as far as can be judged, to American industries."

Domestically, British industries have led a rather sheltered

life in recent years, thanks to the thick matting of "orderly trading" agreements which they have been able to weave in the absence of any anti-trust laws. They would now like to protect themselves from the cold winds of competition in overseas markets, and in order to do so would be very happy to make a deal with American industry dividing up world trade, even on junior-partnership terms. In view of the probable strong competitive position of the United States in the immediate post-war era, their fear that American business will scoff at such a proposition may be justified. Actually, however, there does not seem a great deal of difference in the basic attitudes of British and American business men in this matter. The former frankly deplore competition and restrict it as far as possible; the latter talk loudly about their ability to take it neat but in practice dilute it as far as the Department of Justice will allow them.

The kind of deal the British have in mind is not, therefore, totally inconceivable later on, given an old-fashioned Republican administration here and a Tory government in Britain. Its dangers hardly need underlining, for since the primary aim of such a combination would be to secure maximum profits rather than maximum exchange of goods, it would undoubtedly involve fixing of prices to protect the less efficient members of the cartel and limitation of production. This would prove intolerable both to British and American workers and to consumers the world over.

Another British school of planners, which finds support both in the Labor and Liberal parties and even among the Tory progressives, starts from the premise of maximum expansion of production and trade. It seeks, in the first place, an agreement among all industrial countries to put into effect programs of full employment. This would mean a definite undertaking by each country to insure, by government action if necessary, that total outlay on goods and services would always be sufficient to absorb the production of a fully employed labor force. In the second place, planners of this persuasion look to international cooperation to raise the purchasing power of backward nations. As Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction, said to me when I talked to him in London last November, "The great thing is to find means of increasing the consumption of the primary producers who form the greater part of the world's population but enjoy far too few of the world's goods. If the standards of the Asiatic and African masses can be improved even moderately, there will be no need to worry about industrial capacity being too great. There's no such thing as overproduction, though, God knows, there's plenty of underconsumption."

These two objectives—full employment in the "advanced" countries, greater consumption in the "backward" countries—are closely linked. Full industrial employment means a sustained demand for primary commodities and more purchasing power for their producers. And this in turn means steady markets for industrial products. Britain has been committed by its government, and even more strongly by public opinion, to a policy of full employment. And it is committed by circumstances to paying out for imports whatever it takes in for exports. It has abandoned the idea that a favorable balance of trade is a desirable objective; it sees it rather as an export of man-power for which there is no return, and it expects to be short of man-power for a long time.

The United States, on the other hand, is not committed to a full-employment policy; in fact, efforts to promote one are meeting the most intense kind of opposition. And at the same time the United States has taken no positive steps to reverse its consistent practice since the last war of selling abroad far more than it bought. Even now, while there is some talk of correcting the American trade balance so as to secure a steady flow of dollars into the hands of foreign customers, far more attention is being paid to plans for dumping excess production into overseas markets.

It was with regret rather than surprise that I discovered during my visit to England that many of the economic planners had abandoned hope that America would adopt adequate measures either for full domestic employment or to insure balanced trade. Consequently, they felt that a multilateral, free-exchange international system would neither solve Britain's employment problem nor enable it to expand exports. This argument led, as I explained in a recent article (*Memo for Congress*, March 3, 1945), to intense opposition to the Bretton Woods program, acceptance of which, it was felt, would preclude Britain from maintaining exchange controls, from using subsidies to offset fluctuations in world prices of export goods, and from making long-term sales and purchase agreements with other countries.

I have no space here to describe in detail the kind of closed trading system which is now being elaborated by some British economists. Its clearing arrangements, its blocked accounts, its thinly disguised barter methods proclaim it as the child of Dr. Schacht; its remoter ancestors are Colbert and the eighteenth-century mercantilists. Ignoring for the moment the political reactions to such a policy, we may ask: would it even achieve its aims of insulating British economy from external shocks and of insuring a balance between exports and imports? One of its enthusiastic proponents writes:

Being the world's largest single market for raw materials and foodstuffs, she [Britain] possesses an unbreakable bargaining power. If she employs that power not for purposes of buying cheaply and selling dearly, but so as to increase the volume both of her sales and her purchases, she can be certain of success. Where other nations might attempt to sell on credit, thus burdening their customers with debt, she would be selling goods for goods.*

It is difficult to imagine things working out so pleasantly while foreign trade remains in private hands either in Britain or in the countries it bargains with. The concern of the individual business man is to buy cheaply and sell dearly; as long as he functions he will seek to exploit a closed system to the utmost. As the *Economist*, which itself has toyed with bilateral ideas, said in a recent article: "Schachtian strong-arm tactics, exploiting the attractiveness of the British market to force expensive British goods on those countries that sell here, will work only until the victims find means of escaping."

Adherents of the bilateral principle profess to believe that Britain by adopting it would rally to its side a large group of nations. It would, they suggest, isolate the United States and teach it that America's need of the rest of the world was greater than the world's need of America. This naive view is not shared by many persons in a position to shape or

* "Export Policy and Full Employment." By E. F. Schumacher. Fabian Research Series, 1943.

influence British policy. There is, on the contrary, a complete realization in most political quarters that any attempt to insulate Britain from America by forming a rival system would be fraught with the gravest dangers; that the beginning would be a furious economic battle, the probable end, a clash of arms. But even the most responsible British spokesmen, while condemning the propaganda of the bilateralists, add: Do not drive us into a corner; do not make it impossible for us to carry on the foreign trade we must have as a condition of existence; do not force us to resort to desperate methods. We will not declare economic war on America, but if you force us to fight, we must use any weapon at hand.

This is a reminder of responsibilities which have yet to be fully recognized in this country. There is, for instance, a tendency to assume that obstacles to international trade are almost entirely foreign growths. Americans are apt to talk of the "elimination" of quotas and import embargoes, the "removal" of exchange controls, the "abandonment" of discriminatory trade practices. These crimes against the spirit of the Atlantic Charter have not been practiced in America and hence are condemned out of hand. But when it comes to the tariff, the word is merely "reduction," and little is said against subsidies used as a weapon to overcome foreign competition. America is not yet leading the charge against the international barricades; it is merely exhorting from the rear.

Freedom of trade, however, is not the sole, or even the most important, contribution that America has to make to the restoration and expansion of world trade. In his foreword to "The United States in the World Economy"—a survey made by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce—Wayne C. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Department of Commerce, declares that its most important conclusion is the vital importance of maintaining conditions that permit a larger and more regular flow of dollars to other countries. "The most essential of these conditions," he adds, "lies not in the field of foreign economic policy as such but in the attainment of a more fully and more smoothly operating domestic economy—the major determinant of the volume and course of our purchases of foreign goods and services." In brief, for his own sake and the world's, Uncle Sam needs to cultivate more intensively his own garden. By maintaining full employment and raising living standards at home, a demand for foreign products and services will be automatically created, enabling American trade accounts to balance at a high level rather than a low one. Under such circumstances other nations will be encouraged to emerge from their barbed-wire entanglements and John Bull will not need to go hunting customers with bilateral dynamite.

[This is the third of a series of articles by Mr. Hutchison on Britain's international economic problems.]

Syria: Near East Cockpit

BY MICHAEL CLARK

IN HIS recent report to the Commons Mr. Churchill revealed that, so far as the Middle East and its perennial troubles are concerned, no important decisions were made either at Yalta or later in Egypt. The problems of the Arab world and of the Jewish people in Palestine, he said, must be solved when the war is over. His "clarification" of British policy in Syria and the Lebanon was, however, particularly significant in the light of past events there and of the insistence with which some Syrians and Lebanese have been demanding the total withdrawal of the French. His words were soothing: "Finally, we had the pleasure of a long discussion with President Shukri [Kuwatli] of Syria, in which we did our utmost to enjoin a friendly attitude toward the French and to encourage the negotiation of a suitable settlement with the French, affecting not only Syria but Lebanon."

Thus, in passing, Mr. Churchill disavowed Major General Sir Edward Spears, until December 3, 1944, British minister to the Levant states, and three years of British policy in Syria and the Lebanon. General Spears, it will be recalled, made a speech before the Royal Empire Society on January 17 last which is in curious contrast to Churchill's statement. In it he said that "the respect of the immense Arab world might be lost to us over either of two main issues: Zionism and the French position in the Levant." General Spears, as long as he could, worked tooth and nail to undermine the French position. The problem has not been, as Mr. Churchill's words suggested, essentially a local one, but rather an Anglo-French one. It is always easy to fish in the troubled waters of Middle

Eastern politics. General Spears's success was certainly no greater than that of the Germans, who in 1941 were able to provoke an armed rebellion in Iraq, a country under British domination.

It is quite certain that had General Spears not followed a policy of deliberate provocation, there would be no French-Syrian problem at this moment. But the position of France in Syria and in the world was so weak at the time of the Syrian campaign in 1941 and until very recently that the moment seemed propitious for giving the coup de grâce to its influence in the Levant. The temptation was there, and General Spears, ignoring the remoter consequences of such an attitude, succumbed to it unreservedly. In this he had the full backing of British empire builders in the Middle East and, be it said parenthetically, of the American minister in Beirut, Mr. Wadsworth. The Foreign Office, however, does not seem to have wholly approved, to judge from the recent recall of Spears.

Since 1936 France has been committed to the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. By that time their constitutional structure had been completed, and local governments at Damascus and Beirut were functioning. Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian treaties were therefore negotiated along lines very similar to those of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1931. Unfortunately, the ratification of these treaties, bitterly opposed by reactionary elements in France, was blocked by Georges Bonnet's Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the fall of the

Popular Front Cabinet. When General de Gaulle became "trustee" of French interests in the Levant, at the close of the bloody campaign which ousted the Vichy control in that area, he promptly returned to the policy of 1936, and in the fall of 1941 General Catroux, Free French delegate general in the Levant, proclaimed the independence of the two countries. In his proclamation he said: "On the eighth of last June, at the time of the Allied armies' entry into the Levant, in a manifesto which I addressed to you in the name of Free France and of its chief, General de Gaulle, I recognized Syria as a sovereign and independent state, *under the guaranty of a treaty defining our reciprocal relations*" (italics mine).

Although the principle of a treaty was recognized in every official British declaration of that period—for, indeed, Britain had adopted the same formula in Egypt and Iraq—General Spears did everything in his power to defeat it. And now he accuses France of "withholding the transfer of the army in the hope of forcing the republics to sign treaties."

The regime set up in the Levant in 1941, a species of Anglo-France condominium, gave General Spears ample opportunity to take a hand in local affairs. Although French control of civil affairs was maintained, military control came under British Middle East G.H.Q., and the country was, and is, occupied by elements of the British Ninth Army, with political officers—whose attributions are most vague—in every hamlet. Inasmuch as the dividing line between civil and military affairs often all but disappears in war time, there were actually two plenipotentiary authorities in Syria and the Lebanon—the French General Delegation, and the Spears mission plus the Ninth Army.

In January, 1943, General Catroux reestablished the constitutional life of Syria and the Lebanon and provided for general elections to be held in that year. Immediately there arose in Beirut a sharp controversy over what should be the proportionate number of Christian and Moslem seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Dr. Eyoub Tabet, president of the republic, decreed, on the basis of a census, that there should be fifty-four Christian seats to thirty-two Moslem seats. A howl went up not only from Lebanese Moslems but from Moslems everywhere. The Egyptian Premier, Nahas Pasha, supported by General Spears, brought strong pressure to bear on the French in order to obtain twenty-five Moslem seats to twenty-nine Christian seats. Catroux, cowed by this uproar, forced Dr. Tabet's resignation and fixed the number of seats at thirty for the Christians, twenty-five for the Moslems.

In this envenomed atmosphere the Lebanese elections were held. They provided every opportunity for outside intervention, and considerable sums of money were spent by those who had it. The new Chamber of Deputies, of a marked anti-French color, contained many deputies opposed to Lebanese independence in favor of Syrian and Arab unity, a concept dear to the British so long as it remains purely a concept. The British-supported candidate for President, Bechara el-Khoury, was elected by the Chamber while virtually all the country's senior statesmen, including three former chiefs of state—Messrs. Tabet, Naccache, and Eddé—absented themselves in protest. General Spears had previously warned the deputies that if the French-supported candidate, Emile Eddé,

were elected, His Majesty's Government reserved the right not to recognize the new government on the ground that the general elections had been tampered with. With France deprived of a recognized government, that was potent pressure.

Bechara el-Khoury asked a prominent Moslem, Riad Solh, to form the new ministry. This man had worked for twenty years against the Lebanon's independence. Like so many of his coreligionists he looked upon himself as a Syrian and upon the Lebanon as a province of Syria artificially erected as an independent Christian state by the French to please the Christians. He had taken out his Lebanese identity card just two months before the elections. In spite of Riad Solh's former sympathies for Rachid Ali, the insurgent anti-Ally Premier of Iraq, General Spears found him a willing tool.

Almost the first act of the new government, on November 8, 1943, was to "abrogate" the League of Nations mandate, *ipso facto*, by an act of Parliament—in the absence of the French Delegate General, M. Jean Helleu, who was in Algiers. M. Helleu had left Beirut with Riad Solh's promise not to take any action before his return. While in Algiers he had announced that he was authorized to make effective immediately full de facto independence for Syria and Lebanon. The final disposition of the mandate would have to await the end of the war and the setting up of some new international authority. When he reached Beirut, however, he found himself face to face with a *fait accompli*. His reaction to what was undeniably a hostile and illegal gesture was nevertheless precipitate and very unwise: he arrested the President of the republic, the Premier, several ministers, and one deputy, formed a provisional government headed by Emile Eddé, and called for new elections. Trouble immediately broke out in the Moslem quarter of Beirut and elsewhere. Even the Christians, although fearful of Riad Solh's pan-Arab policies, were shocked that Bechara el-Khoury, a good Maronite Christian and the symbol of the republic, was arrested too. Dispatches from Cairo and Jerusalem, dramatically played up in the world press, picture the trouble as a real revolt, with Beirut put to fire and sword.

General Catroux, at that time Minister of State, was rushed from Algiers to take charge of the situation in Beirut. He was handed an ultimatum by the British giving him twenty-four hours to release the imprisoned statesmen, failing which the country would be occupied outright by the British Ninth Army. Military security was invoked as the reason for this ultimatum. General Catroux, fearing an abrupt liquidation of the French position in the Levant, yielded, and the Khoury government was restored.

Since that time, the Lebanese and Syrian governments, whose independence has been recognized by all the great powers, maintain that the French mandate is definitively abrogated. The French, feeling themselves bound by international obligations, have not been willing to concede this. Nor can Britain, also a mandatory power, afford to do so. Apparently, however, our government, represented in Beirut by a bitterly anti-French minister, George Wadsworth, is prepared to look upon the French mandate as a dead letter.

In December, 1943, a tripartite agreement was signed in Damascus by representatives of France, Syria, and the Lebanon providing for the immediate cession to Syria and the Lebanon of all the sovereign powers previously exercised

in their name, except the territorial army. The transfer of the armed forces, comprising some 29,000 Syrian officers and men under French command, is being delayed, presumably until the end of the war. These troops, dedicated to the defense of the Levant, come under the Allied Middle East G. H. Q. at the present time. The French feel, and the British now appear to agree, that the Levantine governments lack the means, financial and other, to maintain the indigenous army on an efficient war footing. They point out that the internal police of the country, assured by two national gendarmeries, has been turned over to the local authorities and adequately armed by the British. Actually, Syria and the Lebanon are quite as independent as any of the neighboring countries. And France deserves some credit for being the only power which, in time of war, has granted independence to peoples placed under its control.

General Spears, in conversations with Syrians and Lebanese, used to stress the necessity of extorting integral independence at once, while France was only a poor relation and De Gaulle a ruler without a realm. Mr. Wadsworth and the OWI, too, tirelessly opposed a treaty with the Committee of National Liberation, which no one recognized as the legal government of France. Both Spears and Wadsworth realized, however, particularly after General de Gaulle had triumphantly weathered the storm in Algiers, that their maneuvers were essentially a race against time.

Their fears were well grounded. The recognition of General de Gaulle's government and the liberation of France strengthened the French hand to the point where overt provocation in the Levant would clearly jeopardize far greater interests. Churchill has emphasized time and again that a strong and friendly France, essential to the stability of Western Europe, is a cardinal point in British foreign policy. It would be pure folly to allow this new *entente cordiale* to come to grief in Syria. In December General Spears, by now anathema to the French, was recalled and replaced by a career diplomat. The Spears mission was at an end. This step taken, Churchill was able the other day to reaffirm the disinterested policy of Britain in the Levant:

I must make clear the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon and in relation to our French allies. The position is governed by a settlement made in 1941 in which the independence of these Levant states was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time and ever since, His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant states.

If Spears is disavowed, however, whatever advantages may have accrued to Britain as a result of his policy in the Levant are tacitly accepted. Then, too, the United States, which is not bound by the same scruples, remains free to follow an independent course. Spears is recalled, but Wadsworth is not. Churchill was quick to add that his words in no way limited American freedom of action:

Too much must not be placed, however, upon the shoulders of Great Britain alone, and we have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States have recognized and favor Syrian and Lebanese independence, but do not favor any special positions for any foreign countries.

Britain, of course, has special positions in Iraq and Egypt; it governs Palestine outright. These special positions may

need defending at some future moment. It is not yet clear, for instance, what attitude Russia, whose awakened interest in the Middle East has been widely commented upon, will take with regard to the "independence" of Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, and Egypt. A semblance of solidarity between Britain and France may, after all, be worth preserving, even in a British sphere like the Middle East. On the other hand, if what is left of the French position in the Levant succumbs to American, and possibly even Russian, pressure, Britain, whose Ninth Army still occupies Syria and the Lebanon, cannot be held responsible. Long experience has made the Cartesian French wary of the British in the Middle East. Today, as in the past, the French are apt to conclude: *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*

In the Wind

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE apparently considered the first American crossing of the Rhine less important than a local murder. This is how the top of its front page looked on March 3:

 **Chicago Daily Tribune** THE WORLD'S GREATEST NEWSPAPER ** FINAL
VOLUME CITY-NO. 11 SATURDAY, MARCH 3, 1945 - 8 PAGES - 10 CENTS - 10 CENTS

KILLS WOMAN, BURNS BODY

Report Yanks Cross Rhine; Nazis Flee Before 9th Army

THE MASSACHUSETTS Federation of Taxpayers' Associations, one of the most effective "economy" lobbies in the country, has urged the state legislature to raise the Governor's salary from \$10,000 a year to \$20,000.

A NEW YORK federal district court has held that maintenance employees of building, bank, brokerage, and law firms are outside the Wage-Hour Act because they are not engaged in producing goods for interstate commerce. The March 5 bulletin of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States finds the decision "significant and heartening."

ON PAGE TWO of the *Wall Street Journal* for March 7 was a story headed, "Aluminum Called Too Expensive for Wide Use in Autos, Engineer Says." On page four was an advertisement by the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation showing a shiny dream car of the future. "Bohn," said the ad, "is one of America's foremost sources for both aluminum and magnesium products so vital in the modern car."

NOTWITHSTANDING the powerful American Bankers' Association's opposition to the Bretton Woods agreement, the Independent Bankers' Association, an organization of small and medium-sized banks opposed to chain banking, has issued a statement indorsing the agreement in full.

FESTUNG EUROPA: The old people's home at Oslo has been requisitioned by the Nazis. The inmates had to move out to make room for German soldiers. The only ones allowed to remain were the old ladies on the top floor, who are being held as hostages against Allied bombing.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*. We will pay \$1 for each item accepted.]

V-Day and Revolution

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

NINE MONTHS have not yet elapsed since the liberation of Paris, and already voices are bemoaning the waste of a great opportunity; the people's revolution, like the peace, they say, has been virtually lost. I refer to voices from the left. The right is always more shrewd. No matter what its feeling about the course of events, the right follows a strategy better designed to serve its own interest. And that strategy is to proclaim the imminent danger that all Europe will go bolshevik—still an excellent way of rallying and strengthening the counter-revolutionary forces.

The left, and within the left the intellectuals more than the workers, shows the same unhappy inclination it has had for the last two decades to raise the white flag before the battle has really started. In the summer of 1940 many leftists cried that the war was over, when, as we know now, it was only beginning. So today many leftists have admitted defeat when the great metamorphosis of Europe has just begun to unfold. Here, indeed, is a dangerous tendency, for it demoralizes and consequently weakens the left at the very moment when the real struggle between progress and reaction, inside the victorious coalition and inside almost every European country, has been made inevitable by the approaching end of the war.

It will be a terrific struggle. For that fact the chief responsibility rests with those Allied leaders who did not care to or were unable to wage the war as a political war, as a war which made sense only if it were fought for democracy and the complete destruction of fascism. True, Allied leaders have declared that to be their primary objective; but in practice they have looked for Badoglios to help them defeat Hitler—and revolution. Thus did the statesmen support reaction and give it new life, and thus did they provide the conditions for a clash which will be far more brutal than it need have been.

In 1942 civil war could have been avoided. It was still possible to reorient Allied policy so as to secure a democratic victory without obliging the left to launch a new kind of war against fascism as soon as the military war should have ended. The Western Allies did not want it that way. They did not want a victory of the people. So far as the British government was concerned, its attitude was, perhaps, deliberately counter-revolutionary. On the part of the Americans it was, rather, a lack of understanding of Europe and a still greater determination to ignore the true character of fascism.

No matter what it springs from, the fact remains that on the day Hitler falls we shall find ourselves with one defeated enemy and another enemy still to defeat. An artist friend of mine, who has a taste for Goyaesque etchings, sometimes tells me: "In the morning of that day I shall get drunk to celebrate his fall, and in the evening I shall hang myself in order not to witness the victory of the reaction." It is a question of temperament. For myself I prefer to see the reaction hanged. And it can be done, although the process may be long and bloody.

THE STRENGTH OF REACTION

The reaction, of course, is all for returning to the situation prior to 1939. Even British conservatives, with their reputation for flexibility and willingness to yield to the demands of the epoch, rejected the Beveridge Plan though it offered the capitalist regime an unexpected respite. The reactionaries will always fight to hold back the victory of the people. The century of the common man is not their century.

For their success, reactionaries everywhere count above all on support from the United States and Great Britain. They have been encouraged by certain miraculous recoveries made when everything spelled doom. Consider the case of the Vatican. Because it had a Pope whose anti-democratic ideas were well known, because of its scandalous silence on Nazi crimes in the years when Hitler was the winner, because of its intrigues in behalf of Franco and the Argentine dictatorship, people generally assumed that the Vatican would emerge from the war badly discredited. This feeling has nothing to do with religion. Splendid Catholics—Spaniards, Frenchmen, Belgians—have publicly expressed their disagreement with the policy of the Holy See. But since 1943 the two great Western Allies, which are officially Protestant, have done everything in their power to repair the much-damaged moral authority of the Vatican. In maneuvers of appeasement, in every attempt to thwart a real people's victory, a Pope with such good fascist connections was an invaluable collaborator.

Were it not for the direct and indirect support given to the reaction by powerful elements of Western diplomacy, working together with the Vatican, the progressive forces would unquestionably come to power all over Europe after the collapse of Nazi Germany. But the appeasers should not think that they are the only ones who will make decisions in Europe. They would give good proof of their sense of reality if they admitted that Russia, too, will have a few words to say.

I know what certain liberals will answer: Russia is interested only in its national advantage. But I would suggest that the national advantage of Russia and the destruction of fascism may be much more compatible than some of our leftist critics seem to think. The liquidation of feudalism is being speedily carried through in Eastern Europe. The great landed estates are being broken up and distributed to a peasant class which has been earth-hungry for centuries. The purge of fascists has been far more rapid in countries liberated by the Russians than in those liberated by the Western Allies. Whatever the final aims of Russia in Europe, an attempt to recapture 1939 is not among them.

So much for the influence exercised from without. Inside every country the reaction can count upon the "200 families" who, in the years before the war, had already chosen their quislings; upon part of the peasantry, which, although not actively reactionary, can be used by the reaction because of its

traditional hostility to anything that smells of socialism; upon the work of Nazi agents distributed throughout Europe; upon the support of the more aggressive Catholics; upon the revival and exploitation of nationalistic sentiment. But all that put together will not be enough to win victory for the reactionaries unless a divided and defeatist left, lacking strong leadership, does half their job for them.

THE STRENGTH OF THE LEFT

The chief factor operating in favor of the left is the incapacity of the reaction to stabilize the European situation outside the fascist pattern. Before the outbreak of war that incapacity was already evident. Social stabilization, even in the degree that England achieved it, was not accomplished on the Continent after the First World War. It was that failure of capitalism to cope with the successive post-war crises that brought fascism to power. Everything that has happened since then has helped to intensify the disequilibrium.

To begin with, the middle classes, which in England and the United States are the main elements of stability, have been largely eliminated from the European scene. They have seen not only their homes, their businesses, and their savings destroyed by the Nazis but the very concept of ownership, which was their religion and their philosophy. A fourth of Europe has been destroyed. Of the 19,000 buildings in Le Havre, 10,000 have been utterly ruined, another 2,000 are considered irreparable, 5,000 can be repaired, and only 2,000 are relatively undamaged. But later came Dresden, to make Le Havre look like heaven. By the massive Allied air blows of February 14 and 15, "a great city," according to a direct witness, "has been wiped from the map of Europe."

The right is tied to the conception of property. When property breaks down, or is destroyed, the economic strength of the right deteriorates. And with its economic strength, its political power. Under the stress of pre-war instability the right invested in fascism. Now it has lost or is losing its investment, and the power that went with it. Even the monopoly which the right held over patriotism has slipped out of its hands. It was from the "200 families" that the majority of the collaborationists came. All over Europe the left is now the embodiment of patriotism, with all its magnetism.

The left has learned many things during these five years of war. It has learned, among other things, the Nazi art of clandestine activity. Not long ago, in the London *New Statesman and Nation*, Kingsley Martin told the fascinating story of the Athenian elections held during the German occupation. Loud speakers appeared as if by magic, urging everyone to vote, and then they disappeared from the street corners before the Gestapo could arrive. The Germans were inclined to believe that the elections would be held on a hill outside Athens and took the necessary precautions. Actually the voters filled in the forms in their homes. The voting sheets were carried from house to house, and 400,000 Athenians recorded their votes under the Germans' very noses.

Everywhere in Europe the left has trained itself in action. It is not the same left which in 1937 was satisfied to go to meetings and to pass resolutions demanding "*avions pour l'Espagne*" (planes for Spain) only to fall asleep again and allow the fascists to mature their plans and seize key posts in the administration. Today the left is alert. Under its pressure

every Vichy mayor and police chief in France has been cast out. The revival of armed counter-revolutionary bands, of fascist parties, of organizations of conspiracy like the Cagoulards will not be easy for the right today. Of course it will try, but the attempt will only lead to a sharper fight.

THE ROLE OF LABOR

But to win, the left must have a central force around which the various factions can rally and which will be capable of leading them to their last objective: the final destruction of fascism. That force can only be the labor movement. In the long run it cannot be the resistance as a whole. Our faith in the resistance movement as the ally most valuable to the regular armies in the liberation of Europe has been justified everywhere. Not one word written in these columns, from Joseph Kessel's brilliant narrative (January 22, 1944) to our own frequent tributes, need be retracted. One glorious memory will always remain from this war, and that is the memory of the underground's intrepid fight against Nazi armies and internal traitors. But in the resistance many divergent political tendencies were united by the determination to expel the invader. That is why the resistance movement, once the Germans have been conquered, cannot by itself carry a country through a victorious revolution. Its former cohesiveness and aggressiveness are bound to languish when the gigantic enterprise of national liberation is accomplished.

The unquestionable weakening of the movement of resistance from the end of last summer up to now, in France as in other liberated countries, might have proved fatal to the left if there had not been the great reservoir of the labor movement. A most encouraging development is the decision taken by the recent World Trade Union Conference in London to create a new international labor organization. Since it coincided with the meeting of the Big Three at Yalta and with the military successes of February, the conference got less space in the American press than it deserved. It is a supremely important fact that the representatives of more than thirty countries agreed on the need to liquidate the decrepit pre-war trade-union organization and replace it with a new and powerful body in which the most dynamic elements of American labor will work together with the Russian unions, the young but daring Latin American labor organization (the C. T. A. L.), and the reviving movement on the Continent. Labor is no longer the humble supplicant it was in the Geneva days, not when Sidney Hillman could say immediately after the announcement of the San Francisco conference: "The new trade-union international, representing sixty million workers, must take the place that is its due in the first conference called to organize the peace." A statement, not an entreaty. And a statement which made it clear that there is strong direction at the head of the new organization.

That is just what the labor movement has needed—a vigorous leadership, a leadership that knows the power of labor and will not hesitate to use it. We have missed it badly during the last five years. We have missed it particularly in England, where the Labor Party, because it was one of the few working men's parties not destroyed by the war and because of its presence in the government, had an obligation to the whole world labor movement to fight far more stubbornly than it did for the democratic conduct of the war. It was pitiable,

and it plunged large sections of the left into premature pessimism, to see the Labor ministers and a big proportion of the Labor M.P.'s sit silent while Churchill threw life belts to the House of Savoy, uttered eulogies of General Franco, or abused the Greek patriots in the House of Commons. It seems inconceivable that labor should have allowed itself to be kept outside every important international meeting. And now, when a Labor Party representative is to be included in the British delegation to San Francisco, it is the indecisive Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, who has been chosen.

But though it has had weak leadership, British Labor can still be a powerful factor in the transformation of Europe. Its rank and file are eager to further amendment of the conditions prevalent in 1939. Meanwhile, other European Socialists, who were no more fortunate than the British in the matter of leadership, have begun to recover from the disaster into which the Second International's policy of capitulation had led them.

The same is true of the Communists. Although sometimes in retreat, they are still there. True, their position on various European issues has produced surprise and bewilderment among the left. I myself could not accept their explanations of their support of Badoglio. Similarly I was against their policy of including in the Spanish anti-Franco front Gil Robles, Minister of War responsible for the savage repression of the Asturian miners in 1935 and accomplice of Franco in launching the rebellion of 1936. But it is far-fetched to conclude from such mistakes, as many people on the left have done, that the Communists are going to act as a counter-revolutionary force in Europe.

We have the example of France. In September of last year the Communist Party was the strongest as a result of its splendid behavior in the resistance, acknowledged by every Frenchman, right or left, who participated in the movement. From that time on the Communists have been losing ground. *L'Humanité*, the Communist paper, as well as *Le Populaire*, the Socialist paper, have lost considerable circulation in recent months. Because of the need to support the war and their unwillingness to create further difficulties for General de Gaulle, the French Communists have been obliged to retreat since last September, and their influence in the country, as also in a lesser degree that of the Socialists, has been declining. But that does not mean that either party has forfeited its opportunity forever. Already pressure from within their own ranks is forcing them to take a more militant position. They are learning that the men and women who for five long years fought against fascism in the ranks of the resistance are still there—and not too tired to strike again.

THE THREE STAGES

This revolution cannot be successfully effected, the many pitfalls evaded, over night. In fact, viewed in historical perspective, the European revolution is going through three stages, none of which has been entirely completed. The first stage is that of the liberation of the occupied territories. There are still countries which must be freed, like Norway; countries like Italy, where large sections are still in enemy hands and where revolutionary forces are still primarily engaged in a desperate fight against the Nazis. The concern felt in Italy for the time when the strong proletarian forces of the north enter the Italian political scene was voiced by the

venerable Benedetto Croce when he asked for the rapid formation of a great conservative party capable of checking revolution. But without waiting for the liberation of the north, the Italians in Rome showed last week that they cannot be forever pushed around. They showed it by the enthusiasm with which they demonstrated against the scandalous escape from prison of General Roatta.

And aside from those parts of Europe officially occupied, there is Spain, whose people, once they have again mastered their destiny, are hardly going to side with the reaction in European politics.

The second stage is the definite collapse of the Nazi state. Even if the outcome of the war has been self-evident for the last two years and may become effective at any moment, we are still waiting to experience its actual consequences. In itself the fall of Hitler will be an event of extraordinary revolutionary importance, which will give new impetus to the progressive elements of the resistance all over Europe. Few people realize what it will mean to the European peoples when the Red Army marches into Berlin.

During the third stage the greater part of the American and British troops will leave Europe, except, of course, those which will be retained for the military occupation of Germany. Their removal will leave the settlement of European problems to the European peoples. A powerful element of possible coercion will be gone. Gone, too, will be the days of "military expediency," in which any betrayal of the democratic cause found a ready excuse, and the days when the left parties themselves hesitated to attack the policy of appeasement lest they endanger the unity of the Allies.

There will remain, of course, the "invisible occupation," with all the subtle weapons of pressure which Europe's misery and America's enormous resources put into the hands of the Western Allies. It will be easy to say to Europe: if you want to eat, you must adapt yourself to our conception of democracy. The question, however, is not only one of eating. Many Europeans ate better under German occupation than they do today, but that did not make them submissive.

There will remain, above all, the iron hand of capital, particularly American capital, which will not yield a fraction of its sovereign rights and which will help in the reconstruction of Europe only if Europe is to be rebuilt, not for the advancement of the European peoples, but for the profit and power of free enterprise. But there is nothing new in that. After the First World War an attempt was made to stabilize Europe in terms of capitalism. It failed. The first result was fascism; the second, World War II. This time the attempt will fail even more quickly. Only through a planned economy and through solutions very close to socialism have the rebuilders of Europe any reasonable chance of success. The day of effective capitalist control is over; the trend of Europe is toward the left. If the democratic powers had been willing to gear their foreign policy to this trend, the change to a socialized society might have been a peaceful one. They have not done so; instead they have moved from one costly experiment in reaction to another, and in doing so they have only promoted revolution. Let them not count upon the apathy of the people to prevent it. Not even war weariness or disillusionment can head off a change which is part of the whole historical process of our time.

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

The Young Man Jefferson

THE YOUNG JEFFERSON. By Claude G. Bowers. Houghton Mifflin Company. \$3.75.

NO YOUNG man living 175 years ago more completely embodied in himself the nation as it was to be than did the Jefferson of 1775. What Jefferson envisaged before the American Revolution we are today in the United States in actuality. If Winston Churchill or Joseph Stalin or our Latin American neighbors wish to understand how deeply imbedded is the fundamental essence of American democracy, let them read this latest book by Claude Bowers.

More than any other single individual Jefferson is the prophet and the architect of New World democracy. The British democracy in the time of Jefferson was as restricted in its vision and as narrow in its application as the Jewish religion in the time of King David. Jefferson broke the bonds of an established aristocracy, an established church, and an established ignorance. He believed in the potentialities of black men and Indians as well as of white men. Just as the Apostle Paul was driven by the universal implications of the Christian religion, so Jefferson was driven by the universal implications of Anglo-Saxon democracy.

Prophets and Founding Fathers always seem strangely cold, distant, and inhuman. This circumstance is remedied so far as Jefferson is concerned by Mr. Bowers's most recent book. While not as exciting as his two volumes dealing with the Hamilton controversy and Jefferson as President, this book is probably more fundamentally important. And we gain many fascinating glimpses of Jefferson as a human being during the first forty-five years of his life.

Jefferson, despite his belief in democracy, was definitely not a common man. His father had started out as a common man but had accumulated enough property to marry into an aristocratic family. And so the young man Jefferson had an abundance of opportunity to study, to play the violin, to ride horseback, to dance, and to enjoy all the social amenities, including wine and good cooking. Jefferson was never in any sense dissipated, wild, or profligate; yet we can hardly hold up to the youth of the land his first year of college at William and Mary as one which they should imitate. Neither can we suggest that our young people should literally study their eyes out as Jefferson did during his later school career.

Jefferson undoubtedly felt within himself great creative power extending in many directions. Thus we see manifested at quite an early age an intense yet practical interest in science, in the arts, in agriculture, and in graceful living. His interests were not purely intellectual or passive—he did something about them. It was as a young man, not in his old age, that he designed Monticello. As a young man he was a practical lawyer, trying more than four hundred cases a year and earning more than three thousand dollars in lawyer's fees. As a farmer he made a net income of more than two thousand dollars. Wherever he went he had an

excellent wine cellar. As seems so often to be the case with men of artistic temperament, he greatly appreciated association with women. Bowers's account of his lady friends in Paris just before the French Revolution makes most interesting reading.

It seems to me that Jefferson, a most uncommon man, sensed that every common man had in him many of the potentialities which he, Jefferson, recognized in himself. That is why the phrase, "All men are created equal," became the very core of Jefferson's being and eventually, because of Jefferson's efforts, the very core of American democracy. Believing this so strongly, he fought to make the new Virginia constitution, immediately after the Declaration of Independence, into an instrument for religious freedom, free education, and the abolition of slavery and feudalistic land-holding systems. In the most aristocratic of all the colonies Jefferson planted seed which will bear fruit as long as mankind exists.

Jefferson, because he felt in the very center of his being that the supremely important thing about government had to do with insuring to each individual the dignity of his own soul, was a great believer in freedom of all kinds. He was absent from our Constitutional Convention because he was serving as Minister to France, but when the new constitution was mailed to him he insisted by letter from France that there be added to it a bill of rights which would include among other things security for five freedoms—"freedom of religion, freedom of press, freedom from monopolies, freedom from unlawful imprisonment, and freedom from a permanent military."

It is interesting to note Jefferson's reference to "freedom from monopolies" in 1788, in view of the way in which various types of monopolists have been trying to hide behind the phrase "Jeffersonianism" and "states' rights" ever since the time of Theodore Roosevelt. Prior to the time of Theodore Roosevelt the corporations were on the whole against states' rights because they felt they had a better chance with the federal government than with the state governments. With them it has not been a matter of governmental philosophy but of expediency.

No one can read Mr. Bowers's book on "The Young Jefferson" and have any illusions as to where Jefferson himself would stand today if he had the opportunity to battle in his uncommon way for the common man against the forces of hereditary wealth, privilege, and monopoly.

There is an astonishing similarity between Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt in many ways. I cannot help feeling that Roosevelt must have drawn more inspiration from Jefferson than from any other of our historical figures. In both are to be found the same artistic architectural bent, the same love of agriculture, the same joy in the amenities of life, the same capacity for the most careful and precise use of political power. In both also we find world-embracing statecraft. Jefferson as a young man visioned the westward expansion of our nation and the building of the Panama Canal. The im-

portance of Mr. Bowers's book is that it spells out for our young people and our friends overseas just how the young man Jefferson got that way.

HENRY A. WALLACE

NOTES BY THE WAY

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

ONE OF THE BEST DISCUSSIONS of the problem of Germany and of Europe that I have come across is an essay by Hannah Arendt in the winter issue of the *Partisan Review*—because it seems to me to take account not only of the relevant facts but of the feelings, many of them contradictory, which enter into one's thinking about the subject.

For one thing it cuts under the current argument as to whether or not all Germans are bad and always have been—an argument which seems to me, for practical purposes, fruitless. Parenthetically, I was glad to find William Allan Neilson making these sensible and calm remarks in a recent issue of *Herald Tribune Books*: "Slogans such as 'There are no good Germans' not only are contrary to fact and common sense but have as their corollary the total extermination of 80,000,000 people. We all know that this is not going to happen." Those who cling to the slogan in the first sentence must admit the fact in the second. And even if the United Nations go so far as to kill off several million Nazis, there will still be some 70,000,000 Germans in the center of Europe who must live and be lived with.

It will be assumed that Miss Arendt lets the Germans off easy. On the contrary, she gives them full credit for their crimes. But she also feels that when we copy the Nazis in identifying the present behavior of Germans with German history and character we are not only deluding ourselves into believing that to crush Germany is to eradicate fascism but are also bestowing upon Hitlerism the sanction and respectability of a national tradition—which by some fantastic legerdemain must be made to establish a continuity between Immanuel Kant and Adolf Hitler. "The real trouble lies not in the German national character but rather in the disintegration of this character. . . . But a greater trouble still is this, that the man who has replaced *the German*—namely, the type who in sensing the danger of utter destruction decides to turn himself into a destroying force—is not confined to Germany alone." We all know, deep in our hearts, that this is true.

According to her interpretation—which was once widely accepted but has been overborne by the far more comfortable concept of the "bad German"—the breakdown of the social, economic, and political structure not only of Germany but of Europe created a vacuum out of which Hitlerism sprang. And one of its most powerful instruments was a new sort of lie. As she puts it, the Nazis "lied the truth." Their answer to the truth that the class structure of European society could no longer function was "the lie of *Volksgemeinschaft*, based on complicity in crime and ruled by a bureaucracy of gangsters. The declassed [in all countries] could sympathize with this answer. And the truth of the decline of the national state was answered by the famous lie of the New Order in Europe, which debased peoples and prepared them for extermination."

"The gullibility of the European peoples—who in so many cases let the Nazis into their countries because the Nazi lies alluded to certain fundamental truths—has cost them an enormous price. But they have learned at least one great lesson: that none of the old forces which produced the maelstrom of the vacuum is so terrible as the new force which springs from this maelstrom and whose aim is to organize people according to the law of the maelstrom—which is destruction itself."

As proof that the Europeans have learned a great lesson she points out that the resistance movements are non-national in character. Their slogan is simply "Europe." This being so, they are not interested in the German problem as it is presented by the experts but only as it is part and parcel of the European problem. There is in Europe intense political hatred for fascists, collaborationists, and their like, of no matter what nationality. She asserts that there is little hatred of Germans as Germans. This seems hard to believe, but she cites telling evidence from the resistance in various countries. The most striking is the statement of Georges Bidault, former chief of the French resistance and now Foreign Minister, who spoke these words to wounded German soldiers immediately after the liberation of Paris: "German soldiers, I am the chief of the resistance. I have come to wish you good health. May you soon find yourselves in a free Germany and a free Europe." After all, she says, the European resistance "has in many instances fought side by side with German anti-fascists"—whom we find it convenient to forget; and she quotes the testimony of a French officer as to the "active help of German soldiers and workers" inside Germany in making possible some contact between French prisoners of war and the French underground.

The Dutch, the Poles, the Norwegians, and the French agree that German heavy industry must be nationalized—Europeanized would seem to be a more accurate word—that the Junkers and industrialists must be liquidated as social classes. There must be complete disarmament and control of industrial output. But they are against the destruction of German industry, lest half of Europe starve; they fear the transfer of populations lest it prolong chaos and reproduce the old dangers of economic imbalance and the secret rebuilding of an industrial war machine. One may imagine that they look upon proposals for forced labor and transported industry with the same misgivings. They are, moreover, aware of the danger of falling into the Nazi error of racism; and they repudiate the all-enveloping state.

One French program calls for the combining in a single economic system, without changing national boundaries, of the industrial regions of western Germany, the Ruhr, the Saar, the Rhineland, and Westphalia with the industrial regions of eastern France and Belgium. And in France also it has even been observed that "essential restrictions on German sovereignty can be envisaged without difficulty only if all the states likewise accept significant limitations on their own sovereignty."

Left to themselves and given luck, the resistance movements would, in a word, establish a socialist democratic United States of Europe, including Germany as an integrated part. But they are not being left to themselves. The governments in exile, largely as a result of having been in exile, lag far behind the resistance movements both in understanding

and in policy. They are still preoccupied with territory and colonies and national glory. As for the Big Three, they have their own fish to fry.

Miss Arendt feels that the return of the governments in exile may quickly put a stop to the new feeling of European solidarity. But she makes a very interesting analysis of the special position of De Gaulle, whom she describes as a nationalist, not of yesterday, but of day before yesterday. For him the war is really a national and not an ideological conflict. By the same token he is a true, if old-fashioned, patriot. This meant that he was incapable of being a traitor. And "his patriotism is so deeply rooted in the popular will that the resistance, that is, the people, was able to support and influence his policies." On this score she notes, for instance, that though De Gaulle, in exile, had demanded annexation of the Rhineland, he stated soon after his return to Paris that all France wanted was an active share in its occupation. On the other hand, it must be noted that his opposition to fundamental economic changes in France is increasing, not diminishing, despite popular pressure for change. Is this the result of Big Three influence coinciding with his own conservative inclinations?


What Miss Arendt maintains, in short, is that nationalism is on the wane among the peoples of Western Europe and that a federated Europe is waiting to be born; that in such a federation the German people would become healthy and, on the political side, finally catch up with the rest of Western democratic Europe; and that the real problem today is how to prevent the Big Three and their dependents, the governments in exile, from smothering the new Europe under the blankets of power politics and attempts to restore the status quo.

I think it makes sense.

VOSKOVEC AND WERICH, who take the parts of Trinculo and Stephano in the current production of "The Tempest," and are, to my mind, the best part of the show, are probably the only comedians who may also be described as contributors to *The Nation*. As the program notes inform us, they have been mainly occupied since their arrival in this country in broadcasting to Czechoslovakia through the OWI. They write their own scripts, of course, and *The Nation* printed one of them two years ago.

FRANCE AMERIQUE, one of the French newspapers published here, reports that the first number of the magazine which will replace the defunct *Nouvelle Revue Française* will appear as soon as Jean Paul Sartre returns to Paris from his visit to the United States—in about three weeks. It is to be called *Les Temps Modernes*, not *La Condition Humaine* as was first planned. Sartre, so the report goes, will contribute an important manifesto under the title "Pour une littérature engagée." *France Amérique* wonders whether this means "the crumbling of the last ivory towers," and answers, "Perhaps." One can understand why the writers of France are not in a mood to look kindly on ivory towers. The great question is when is an ivory tower not an ivory tower. So often the so-called ivory tower turns out to be not only firmly "engagée" but the only structure that survives when the guns are silent.

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BRIEFER COMMENT

Falstaff and Doll Common

IT IS FREQUENTLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED by otherwise cautious scholars that the supreme greatness of Shakespeare was already recognized in the seventeenth century. In "Shakespeare and Jonson: Their Reputations in the Seventeenth Century Compared" (University of Chicago Press, two volumes, \$7.50) Professor Gerald Eades Bentley presents the result of the most thorough objective inquiry ever made into the question he investigates, and comes up with somewhat surprising results. Having first collected a considerable number of allusions to both dramatists overlooked in the various existing "allusion books," he adds them to the corpus, discards all references which are doubtful or of no significance to this inquiry, and then classifies those which remain—more than fourteen hundred allusions to Shakespeare, more than eighteen hundred to Jonson—into such groups as "passages in which the name of the dramatist is used alone as a standard of poetic or dramatic greatness," "literary references to a character in the works of Shakespeare or Jonson," and so on. In nearly all the twenty different classes recognized, the references to Jonson are more numerous than those to Shakespeare, and Mr. Bentley's conclusion that "to writers of the seventeenth century Jonson was better known and more highly respected than Shakespeare" seems justified. The phrase "to writers" is very important, since writers would be prejudiced in favor of a man universally admitted to be more learned and "correct" than his rival, and it is highly significant that the one very important class of allusions in which references to the work of Shakespeare are strikingly more numerous than references to that of Jonson is the class in which there is a literary reference to a character in a play. The 696 such references to Shakespearean characters contrast strikingly with the 320 to characters from Jonson's dramatic works. It looks, in other words, as though the seventeenth-century writers who had intellectually convinced themselves of Jonson's superiority unconsciously betrayed the fact that even to them Shakespeare's personages were the more memorable. Falstaff is mentioned nearly four times as often as his nearest rival, Brutus, and nearly five times as often as Hamlet, who comes next. And all three of these appear more often than does Doll Common, who heads the list of Ben Jonson's characters.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

A Momentous Decade

THE EIGHTEEN-EIGHTIES in England were the years when, according to your point of view, the termites of collectivism started to undermine the economic structure or the warm sun of socialism began to break up the *laissez faire* icefield. Winston Churchill, a nostalgic historian, has written of the period as "the end of an epoch"; Helen Merrell Lynd in "England in the Eighteen-Eighties: Toward a Social Basis for Freedom" (Oxford, \$4.50) emphasizes its importance as the beginning of a new social era.

Although she carefully refrains from overstressing the

point, Mrs. Lynd was obviously attracted to this decade in England because of the parallels it affords with that of the nineteen-thirties in America. It was an age when economic progress, which had enriched the middle classes and kept the workers buoyed with hope, no longer appeared automatic. It was an age of agricultural and industrial depression accentuated by the challenge to Britain's muscle-bound monopolies offered by the rising industries of America and Germany. It was an age when the newly enfranchised workers began to be aware of their political and industrial power and to exercise it to improve their conditions. "The poor" could no longer be "kept in their places"; they were becoming "the people," and both the traditional parties were forced to compete for their votes. Willy-nilly, the "upper classes" could no longer ignore such problems as housing, sweating, and unemployment—the word was first used in 1888.

Being a sociologist as well as a historian, Mrs. Lynd is concerned not only with what happened but with why it happened. "How did people more generally become aware of the basic discrepancy between social fact and social theory?" she asks, and seeking an answer she traces the changes in social values in many fields—politics, organized labor, religion, education. The new ideas did not come with a burst of enlightenment, but gradually taking hold, they laid the foundation for the "welfare state" which today is expressed by Beveridge schemes and plans for full employment. Now as in the eighties, Mrs. Lynd points out, we are still stating the problem of freedom negatively: we are seeking freedom *from* want, freedom *from* ignorance. The social structure which will provide freedom *for* the full realization of human potentialities is yet to be built.

In writing this book Mrs. Lynd has obviously mined assiduously a mountainous mass of memoirs, Blue Books, and reports of Royal Commissions, and her labor has been rewarded by many quotable nuggets of pure gold. Better still, she has written so well and organized her material with such skill that her book is as readable as it is scholarly.

KEITH HUTCHISON

Croce Nods

BENEDETTO CROCE'S "Politics and Morals" (Philosophical Library, \$3) is something of a pot-boiler. Even a pot-boiler by a great master may deserve respect, for some of the wisdom of the master is almost bound to seep into even his most casual work. This new volume by Croce contains passages in which the precision and profundity of a great mind are quite apparent. Croce understands both the moral basis of the political order and the difficulty of equating political standards too simply with moral ones. Yet the work is on the whole slight.

Croce is concerned to defend the liberal tradition against both the authoritarianism of the right and the totalitarianism of the left. He defines liberalism as the capacity to "remain perpetually alive, and able to state and solve the problems that arise ad infinitum in life, and able to develop dogmas perpetually without ever nullifying them but making them always deeper and larger." Curiously enough, he derives political liberalism from philosophical idealism and declares that "naturalism, positivism, and scientific principles" are "all

associated with authoritarian concepts or lead to them." There may be a larger measure of truth in this accusation than many a modern liberal is able to realize, but as a general proposition it seems almost as perverse as the belief that philosophical idealism is the father of political liberalism.

Croce believes in the theory of "free enterprise" as a general basis for the democratic community, but he also believes that "if the theory is changed from a legitimate economic principle to an illegitimate ethical theory, to a hedonistic and utilitarian morality," it sows confusion in politics. Whether modern technical developments give laissez faire theories the validity, even in the economic realm, which Croce ascribes to them is a question that cannot be settled by the *obiter dicta* of even a great philosopher.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Something Wrong Here

IT IS A STRANGE PHENOMENON that the war now being fought so bitterly against Japan seems destined to result in peace terms that will not greatly change the regime that plotted Pearl Harbor. Wilfrid Fleisher tells us that the terms sketched in his "What to Do with Japan" (Doubleday Doran, \$2) are likely to constitute "the sort of peace we may expect." It will be a peace, he says, that will keep the emperor system, the big monopolists, the landlords, and the bureaucrats. The only group omitted is the militarists, but from this congenial "old crowd" it may be taken for granted that even they will not long be absent. And so one is forced to ask whether the "tough" disarmament provisions that make up the rest of Fleisher's plan will be adequate. A peace of this sort will return the Japanese people to their former servitude to their old despotic ruling groups. It will condemn to the hangman's noose those Japanese who may be expected to struggle for a democratically organized society in the aftermath of defeat. To put it very bluntly, we shall be deliberately seeing to it that the people of Japan are not permitted to have the democracy for which we are fighting. Somehow, one feels, there is something wrong here; this is not a sound basis for a lasting peace with Japan, nor does it square with our professed war aims.

T. A. B.

Asia Tomorrow

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ASIA in the world of tomorrow is a subject on which most Americans have done far too little thinking and planning. But it is doubtful whether anyone can read Owen Lattimore's challenging "Solution in Asia" (Little, Brown and Company, Atlantic Monthly Press Book, \$2) without a sober appreciation of the critical importance of that area in the post-war world. Mr. Lattimore makes it clear that our pre-war policies in the Far East were governed by an extraordinary hodge-podge of misinformation and smug illusions. We consistently underestimated Asia's revolutionary movements and stubbornly closed our eyes to the significance of the Russian revolution to millions of Orientals. We misread the plain implications of Japan's pan-Asiatic movement and rested comfortably in the assurance that our naval superiority would protect us. When Japan attacked China, we were sure that it was merely a local quarrel with Chiang Kai-shek; no one seemed to realize that the attack was pri-

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begins to write for the New Leader and that the Anniversary Issue will contain the first of a series of articles by this famous publicist entitled

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marily an attempt to eliminate American and British influence in the Far East.

As a protection against similar errors in the future, Mr. Lattimore makes a penetrating analysis of the Chinese internal situation. He points out that the Kuomintang has deteriorated from a coalition party embodying most of the elements in Chinese society to a relatively narrow one based on landlord support, while the Communists have broadened their basis of support to include not only peasants but a considerable number of landlords, small business men, and intellectuals. The solution of the Chinese situation, he suggests, depends on close collaboration among the British, American, and Soviet governments to coordinate military and economic policy, and on encouragement of democratic reforms. He warns against isolating the problem of the Communist troops, pointing out that a considerable part of the so-called National Army is in fact a Kuomintang Party army and should be treated on the same basis as the Communist army. Although the book was written weeks before the Crimea Conference, it is essentially a challenge to adapt the principles and policies of Yalta to the Pacific, to recognize the tremendous role that Russia is bound to play in the post-war world in Asia as well as in Europe, and, above all, to be sensitive to the newly awakened aspirations and ambitions of the common peoples of this great section of the earth.

MAXWELL S. STEWART

FICTION IN REVIEW

Mr. Wescott's War Work

BECAUSE Glenway Wescott's new novel, "Apartment in Athens" (Harper, \$2.50), is written with a specific political purpose—to increase our hatred of Germans and warn us against trusting them even if they should begin to act better—I suppose that any response to it is in large part a response to this central idea; and perhaps, therefore, I should start by making clear my own stand on a controversial subject. Not that I cherish my confusions, but I publish them in order to feel free to discuss "Apartment in Athens" without reference to a hidden political point of view. On the one hand, then, I do not agree with my friends who think of Germany as simply a stage of historical development and of the German people as without special responsibility for the outrages of Nazism; I think that nations have temperaments or characters among which we can choose by a moral standard. On the other hand, I have never seen a statement of the case against the German people—as opposed to the Nazis—which didn't make me as uncomfortable about the condemner as about the condemned.

Of course, the fact that Mr. Wescott's novel suggests the need for this kind of preface to a review strikes me in itself as a sad commentary on the book. We don't expect a writer of Mr. Wescott's caliber to use his talents in the service of propaganda, and I especially didn't expect him to propagate hatred. To the writer of real creative power there is usually something deeply antipathetic in the act of subordinating free creativity to indoctrination, and where there is as much critical awareness of style as in all of Mr. Wescott's work,

I would have expected—though, I now see, mistakenly—to find enough critical awareness of self to save an author from guilty gestures. We are told that Mr. Wescott calls "Apartment in Athens" his war work. It is the kind of war work we commonly look for, not at the head or heart of intellectual and artistic life, but at its fringes, where conscience seems to exist only to be uneasy.

I have read dozens of anti-Nazi novels, set either within Germany itself or, like "Apartment in Athens," in a German-occupied country. Except for its distinction of prose which, through at least the first half of the book, keeps promising that this will be a disinterested creative effort, and except for its wonderful power to evoke physical fact, Mr. Wescott's novel doesn't in any important sense transcend this popular and bad category of fiction. There is not a single political-moral insight in "Apartment in Athens," not a new political perception, such as we have the right to demand from a serious novelist. Teaching us to hate, a questionable activity at best, it doesn't teach us to hate any more intelligently than we might be taught by any writers'-war-board hack. I even find something offensive, or at least wry, in the fact that Mr. Wescott's novel is set in Greece instead of Czechoslovakia or Norway. For although you may need only passion and four walls to make a drama, you need more than passion, four walls, and a glimpse of the Acropolis to give a drama classic dimensions.

In outline the story of "Apartment in Athens" is simple. The time is after the occupation. A German officer, Captain Kalter, has been billeted on the Helianos family—Mr. and Mrs. Helianos and their two children. At first only worn and humiliated by their service to Captain Kalter, gradually Mr. and Mrs. Helianos begin to experience a certain gratification in their subservient role. They are the type for conciliation: before the war Mr. Helianos had been a liberal editor; he loves to think and talk; and Mrs. Helianos is sickly and passive. Then Kalter goes home on leave and in Germany learns that his wife and sons have died in the war. Sufficiently demoralized by this blow to be softened in his attitude toward the Helianos family, Kalter tempts Mr. Helianos to speak a sentence in blame of Hitler and Mussolini. This is the point at which Mr. Wescott discloses the message of his novel: for all his apparent softness, Kalter shows himself to be deeply unregenerate. He has Helianos arrested for the insult to his Führer and even from beyond the grave, after he has shot himself, continues to teach the Helianos family the price you pay for supposing that a German is human when he appears human. The book ends with a series of letters from the imprisoned Greek to his wife, exhorting her to take this moral to heart, indeed, to see that a cousin in the underground gets to America with his urgent warning.

This is the broad substance of Mr. Wescott's novel. It is not a book of action so much as a thickly woven psychological study. But its psychology is chiefly the kind of psychopathological embroidery that current fiction, especially current anti-Nazi fiction, goes in for so lavishly: for instance, a good deal of space is devoted to the two Helianos children—Leda, who has been completely stupefied by her premature vision of slaughter, and Alex, a half-stupid, half-competent young boy whose mind has also been sickened by exposure to brutal-

ity. (Yet the fact that at the end of the book Mrs. Helianos dedicates this poor starveling to the underground is presented as a proper act of maternal fortitude.) However, there is also the detailed investigation of the relation between Helianos and his wife as it changes under the strain of Kalter's powerful presence: some of these domestic scenes are created with an almost unbearable naturalism. These are the moments in which Mr. Wescott is at his most gifted, giving us a glimpse of the talent which signalized even a book that was not entirely successful, his "The Pilgrim Hawk" of a few years ago.

I opened this review with a statement of my own position on the German question. It is a middle and, if you will, muddled position; it doesn't tell us what kind of peace to make with Germany. But it seems to me that as against the "practical" politics of Mr. Wescott's book, it allows for rather more realism. A novel about occupied Greece, "Apartment in Athens" purports to look to the future fate not only of Greece itself but of the other small countries of Europe, in fact, of the rest of the world. It was written not very long ago, and yet, in what was probably the interim between its composition and its publication, consider what actually happened in Athens. Greece was liberated from its German conquerors, but what part of a permanent solution of its political problems did this constitute? In the light of the very recent history of the very country in which Mr. Wescott sets his novel, nothing, it seems to me, could be less practical than to delude ourselves that the solution of the problems of Europe after this war hinges solely on the degree of our distrust of Germany. Whatever our need for realism about the Germans, if we are not going to see the whole political forest for this particular thicket, we are not only going to have bad novels in the post-war world, we are going to have a bad post-war world.

DIANA TRILLING

CONTRIBUTORS

ANITA BRENNER grew up in Mexico and has written several books about it, of which the most recent is "The Wind That Swept Mexico: The History of the Mexican Revolution 1910-1942," with 184 historical photographs assembled by George B. Leighton.

KEITH HUTCHISON, an associate editor of *The Nation*, has recently returned from a visit to England.

MICHAEL CLARK was for two years *The Nation's* accredited correspondent in North Africa and the Middle East.

HENRY A. WALLACE'S public career is sufficiently well known to need no recounting here. Among his books are "The Century of the Commn Man" and the forthcoming "Sixty Million Jobs," to be published at the end of April.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH is Brander Matthews Professor of Dramatic Literature at Columbia University. In addition to the recently published "Samuel Johnson" he is the author of "Comedy and Conscience After the Restoration" and "The American Drama Since 1918."

REINHOLD NIEBUHR, professor of Christian Ethics at Union Theological Seminary, is chairman of the Union for Democratic Action. Among his books are "The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness," "The Nature and Destiny of Man," and "Christianity and Power Politics."

MAXWELL S. STEWART, an associate editor of *The Nation*, lived in China for six years. He is a member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and author of "War-Time China," published under the institute's auspices.

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MEXICAN HAYRIDE

by HERBERT & DOROTHY FIELDS • Staged by HASSARD SHORT
SONGS BY COLE PORTER

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Fund.

Art

CLEMENT
GREENBERG

FOUR or five pictures at Arnold Friedman's show at the Marquie Gallery (through March 24) establish him as one of the strongest and most original landscapists we have. A member chronologically of John Sloan's generation, Friedman has had trouble finding himself—he earned his living as a post-office clerk—and only lately, being able to devote all his time to painting, has he discovered his true vein—the atmospheric landscape. Perhaps this delay accounts for the unevenness of his work, which even today, like faulted strata that have broken through to the surface, exhibits simultaneously almost every phase of his past. Thus his genre scenes remind one poignantly of the American impressionist-realist school of the early century: Sloan, Glackens, and their fellows—who produced what in my opinion still remains the best American painting of our time. Details in other pictures are reminiscent of later developments. Only in his landscapes does Friedman arrive at himself.

Like most contemporary landscape painters of any merit, Friedman works with the inheritance left by impressionism and Cézanne, eschewing values for frank color and controlling space by warms and cools rather than by darks and lights. His preference for the simple, rectilinear composition is offset, as was the case with Pissarro too, by his success in intensifying surface and texture. He paints best with the palette knife, scumbling colors one over the other, and using very little medium. The result is complex, ripe, wistful, atmospheric, and at the same time solid and monumental.

None of this gives any idea of Friedman's originality. He is possibly the only really original landscapist left in this country after Marin. His originality is the expression of a pure, honest, serious, and independent personality rather than of a method. A character to which all chic and facility are foreign yields an absolute contribution—which is even greater than most of those who admire his art realize. Friedman has managed to make the landscape—hardly the typical genre of our age—express something of this age's abiding emotions: the sad remoteness of nature, the anonymity of cities, and the permanence of art. Here for the first time the real pessimism of suburban life comes through in painting.

Friedman will paint even better in the future, ironing out inconsistencies in quality and receiving, I feel sure, a recognition delayed so far only by the current tendency to identify art with chichi. The irony in the note which he himself wrote for his catalogue is justified, but not its humility.

Films

JAMES
AGEE

IN A newsreel theater not long ago I saw a version of the Crimea Conference which was so well photographed and so quietly, sensitively, leisurely cut that I wished I might know whose work, or even which company's, it was. It had a feeling for weather and light and space, for the proper insertion of side detail, and for personalities and their proper timing, progression, and juxtaposition, which I am tempted to compare with the clean-water physical absoluteness of Tolstoy's writing. Actually, there was nothing about it of that grand order except in the event, even so much of it—a good deal—as one could read in glimpses of the faces; the way it was handled by camera men and cutters was merely right, which is a rarity and somewhere near a God's plenty. I would like especially to suggest that the shots of President Roosevelt, which I thought extremely moving, may turn out to be the most crucial and revealing portraits of him we are ever likely to get.

The other current movies are so tired-out and bleak that I can hardly write of them. "Hotel Berlin," the most heavily routine of Warner Brothers' political melodramas, is stuffed with sympathetic veterans like Peter Lorre and Henry Daniell and George Coulouris and Raymond Massey, and with sympathetic and understandably more eager young people like Andrea King and Faye Emerson and Kurt Kreuger, but the only thing that had even a chance for any pure quality was a bit by Helene Thimig. "Thunderhead, Son of Flicka" has some beautiful horses, especially a heart-stopping, blue-eyed, pure-white stallion whom I would love to see in any adequately fierce movie about Pegasus or the Houyhnhnms or, for that matter, in any really appreciative story about plain horses. This is not such a story. Whenever the horses are busy, it is pleasant to look at; but so are moving clouds, or water, without much credit to their

recorder. The picture gets very little even out of the mild drama it allows itself; nothing whatever of the power and glory there could be in a properly unhuman film about wild and half-wild animals.

Two pictures that I can recommend you are unlikely to get a chance to see—even, I'm afraid, if you live within reach of the small "art" theaters which alone handle nearly all great or even half-good films, along with so much false art and simple trash. "Break the News" was made in England by René Clair, with Jack Buchanan and Maurice Chevalier. It isn't at all on the level with those Clair films of which the mere recall can bring me tears of admiration and of a detached sort of pride; but it is full of ease and fun and extravagant but unstrained irony, enjoyable of themselves, and worth watching too because they so clearly indicate that, though England was not a good place for Clair to work, it was not, like this country, a hell on earth. "I Met a Murderer" interests me particularly because I am forced more and more to the narrow, dismal hope that if good movies are to be made any more at all, in this country anyhow, they will have to be made on shoestrings, far outside the industry, and very likely by amateurs or at best semi-professionals. This one was made in England, several years ago; the only person involved in it whose name I know is the actor James Mason. An unpretentious murder story including a romance and a chase, and strongly influenced by Hitchcock, it seems obviously to have been made in the hope that it could get commercial distribution. And that on the whole I trust, believing that most though not all good films get much of their vitality and resonance by being designed for a broad mixed audience, whether or not they turn out to satisfy such an audience. Though it tries almost too hard for its own artistic good—and often with remarkable smoothness—to look "professional," the picture is streaked with enough amateurishness to pretty well guarantee its commercial failure. There are also some downright poor things in it, some undigested-arty, others catch-penny flops. Often, too, when it might be very exciting—as when the hunt for the killer and the hunt for a fox interinvolve—the picture fails in most of those establishers of casual reality, and oblique cutting-edges of ironic or sensuous detail, by which Hitchcock, for instance, would have absolved or even transfigured and reinforced the over-

obviousness of the parallel. In such passages I have to admit that any professional would have got it by the audience better than any amateur, though probably more emptily; and that only a thorough artist with a thorough professional training could really hope to make it come, right.

Yet this is one of the fairly few movies I have seen in years in which it was clear that its makers knew and cared and in general had lively, sensible ideas how each shot should follow the next, and what in the way of emotion, atmosphere, observation, and psychological weight and progression each shot and each group of shots should contain. I also thought it graceful, gallant, resourceful, and in every way satisfying and encouraging in its broken-field run through the problems of cost. It is certainly not a great or even a memorably good movie, and in any ultimate sense I doubt that it was particularly worth the trouble to make: except that every such difficult undertaking, even half so well planned and carried out, seems of itself a worthier and more heartening achievement than any save the best films made under whatever circumstances. Without all these special prejudices in its favor, for that matter, I think it better and more enjoyable than most studio pictures.

B. H. Haggin's column on Music will appear as usual next week.



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NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS

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LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

Prejudice Takes a Licking

Dear Sirs: I have read Dorothy Baruch's moving article, *Sleep Comes Hard*, in *The Nation* for January 27 and found particular interest in her account of how the Maxwell family was driven from a white community by ostracism, slander, and threats of violence. I'd like to say that it doesn't have to be that way. Prejudice can be licked. We did it in our own neighborhood. Perhaps the case of the Johnsons of West Hollywood and their victory can be taken as a pattern for similar victories in other communities. The backbone of the pattern is the militant decency of most people once they are informed, aroused, and organized.

The Johnsons—that isn't their real name—are a Negro family, and they couldn't find a place to live at any price. Finally they bought a house in our district, which is white, and moved in. Their next-door neighbors were outraged, drew up a petition, and began a campaign among the whites to force the Johnsons to vacate. The bigots were off to a flying start. But that was as far as they got. As they circulated their petition they were astonished and dismayed to find that people refused to sign it. The Johnsons still live in their new home, and they will continue to stay there. They have not been ostracized, and they are becoming part of the life of the community.

The Johnsons fared better than the Maxwells, not because we have fewer bigots in our district or are in any way unusual, but simply because neighborhood liberal elements were already geared to fight. This is the way we did it. Just before the last election a group of us had formed the West Hollywood Committee to help reelect Roosevelt and to further democracy. After election we enlarged our membership and tried to work at being responsible citizens—we studied local, state, national, and international affairs, formed investigating and study groups, and made our wishes known to our legislators in Sacramento and Washington.

When the Johnson incident occurred, we were prepared. Our first step was to welcome the Johnsons and assure them of our support and friendship. They were asked to join our club and did so. Next we studied the legal aspects of the case and conducted a whirlwind house-

to-house campaign against the petition being circulated by the bigots. Members spoke to non-member friends, who were also pressed into the fight. Naturally not everyone was with us, but the decent people rallied to the cause and we were able to defeat the petition. As a result the Johnsons have a home, West Hollywood has acquired another worth-while family, and the practicing democrats are welded together more firmly than ever by this common experience.

This may be a small victory, but a million similar victories would be a good start toward reclaiming the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment from the junk pile. That is why, while I share Miss Baruch's bitterness at the plight of the Negro, I can by no means accept her despairing view of the problem. JARMILA MARTON
West Hollywood, Cal., February 23

A Welcome Elimination

Dear Sirs: After noting the reference in the February 10 issue of *The Nation* to the Gideons and the requirement of that organization that any member be white, I wrote the secretary. You will be interested to know that I received a letter from him dated February 20 in which he says: "I am pleased to inclose a copy of the application blank which we are now using, and you will note the word 'white' has been eliminated therefrom." *The Nation* seems to have become a Christian evangelist.


G. BROMLEY OXNAM,
Bishop of the Methodist Church
New York, February 26

Arms and the Peace

Dear Sirs: The chief argument in favor of the enactment of peace-time military training and conscription in the United States advanced by Irving Lipkowitz in his article in the March 3 issue is that it will give us a citizen rather than a professional army.

The assumption on which Mr. Lipkowitz and others base their thesis is an ominous one and requires careful thought. We must be prepared to maintain a much bigger peace-time military establishment than before because "no matter what we say or do within our own country, the world is going to have an armed peace for some years to come."

Crossword Puzzle No. 107 by JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

- 1 Of Dido's city
- 4 Two are better than one — except when you have a headache
- 7 Does such knowledge show that a scholar is ready to be plucked?
- 9 Disproves little more than a picturesque enigma
- 10 Treves
- 12 Flying castle
- 13 Usually 4 lbs. in every 104
- 15 A sort of "Who's Who" of the British peerage (two words, 3 & 4)
- 17 German ballads
- 18 A big punch isn't much good without this
- 19 Perhaps you have one to grind?
- 21 Drug popular with insomniacs
- 23 They evidently don't need 21 Across
- 24 Every schoolboy has used this crib
- 26 Not right angle, stupid!
- 28 Only Basques and Scots are supposed to know how to wear them
- 31 Penetrated
- 32 This maintained four men, according to Goldsmith, ere England's griefs began
- 35 A bad wind for anglers
- 36 Series of six numbers (though we can see ten in it!)
- 37 "Loveliest village of the plain" (Goldsmith)
- 38 He made his subjects pay through the nose
- 39 The sum is complete
- 40 Does your pronunciation of this English county suggest pain or cards to you?

DOWN

- 1 Keep up
- 2 A sexless creature, the honey-bee
- 3 Has yours beautiful eyes? Moliere's had
- 4 Vessel on fire? (hyphen, 3-3)

- 5 Not bad, I think, for a little 'un (hidden)
- 6 As a gun
- 7 "Not ----- sights alone, but ----- sounds, exhilarate the spirit"
- 8 Inclined but flat
- 11 Emblem of purity worn by judges
- 14 This is not what the Spanish and Portuguese call this river
- 15 A sign of indignation, perhaps (two words, 3 and 4)
- 16 Congenial as a good-natured Russian
- 19 Surplice
- 20 A month on it is quite a fair time
- 21 A musician puts this flower against his neck
- 22 Good soldiers never retreat; they -----
- 25 It may be humbug to you; it is not to the druggist
- 27 Lad One coming up!
- 28 One half of this African stock is just like the rest
- 29 South African antelope found in part of England
- 30 Armchairs covered with this are intended to be
- 33 A hundred strike — for a scrap of paper!
- 34 No one's taken in by it
- 35 He will be sore if you stand him on his head!

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 106

ACROSS:—1 SLEEP; 4 IDRIS; 7 UPLANDS; 10 FUSEL; 11 MAGOG; 12 LEVITES; 13 AWLS; 16 FLAT; 18 ATHOS; 20 AWEARY; 21 NOBODY; 22 GIDEON; 24 ESKIMO; 25 TOSCA; 26 BEER; 28 GUYS; 31 ENGIRES; 33 BOGUS; 34 ADAIR; 35 MOTTEUX; 36 OUNCE; 27 EAT UP.

DOWN:—1 SOFIA; 2 EDSSEL; 3 PULL; 4 ISMS; 5 REGAL; 6 SIGHT; 8 LEVITY; 9 NATION; 14 WRANGLE; 15 SLENDER; 16 FOOLING; 17 ANYBODY; 18 ARGOT; 19 SOUSA; 23 NOUGAT; 24 ECARTE; 26 BABOO; 27 ELGIN; 29 UNAPT; 30 SYRUP; 31 ESME; 32 SAXE.

Liberals are going to have to get over "their traditional antipathy to all things military," an antipathy of which we used to boast and which was largely responsible for bringing millions of immigrants from lands burdened with conscription to "free America."

To some of us it seems odd that under a system of "collective security" in which nations are going to pool their resources to achieve an "enforceable peace," all of them have to have bigger military establishments than before.

Harry Hopkins, who probably speaks with more authority than Mr. Lipkowitz, lays bare the real difficulty with admirable frankness in his article on the same theme in the March issue of the *American*: "We must accept a new and tough concept in world affairs. . . . America's heart and mind will work intensively day and night to keep the world in peace. But that isn't enough. We can't take a chance. When this war ends, we must immediately prepare to defend ourselves." There is to be an organization to keep the peace, but we can't depend on it; we have to rely on our own defense, hence conscription. Surely no one in his senses thinks other powers will not follow the same plan. This means an armament race of unprecedented magnitude. All such arguments as those we are discussing are escape mechanisms, evasions of the proposition that we can have world organization and genuine collective security or we can have huge national military establishments and an armament race; we can't have both.

Secondly, Mr. Lipkowitz does not deal with the question how large a professional standing army will be needed to train and—in this age of super-mechanized warfare—to supplement the conscript "civilian" forces. The *Army and Navy Journal* on September 9, 1944, remarked that "without a professional army of sufficient proportions, the large civilian reserve . . . would lose a great deal of its effectiveness." Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, writing in *American Defense*, July, 1944, presented a theoretical arrangement of figures for a military system based on universal training and allocated a million men to the standing forces of army, navy, and air. Until this and other points are cleared up, how do we know that it is *either* conscription or a large professional establishment and not rather both?

A. J. MUSTE, Executive Secretary,
Fellowship of Reconciliation
New York, March 5